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Article

Lawyers, Not Widgets: Why Private-Sector
Attorneys Must Unionize to Save the
Legal Profession
†

Melissa Mortazavi

INTRODUCTION
More than two decades ago, Chief Justice Rehnquist lamented:
It seems to me that a law firm that requires an associate to bill in excess of two thousand hours per year . . . is substantially more concerned with profit-maximization than were firms when I practiced.
Indeed, one might argue that such a firm is treating the associate
very much as a manufacturer would treat a purchaser of one hundred
tons of scrap metal: if you use anything less than the one hundred tons
1
that you paid for, you simply are not running an efficient business.

Little has changed since; if anything, practicing law as a
2
business is now the prevailing norm. Work in a firm, particularly “big law,” is often grueling, hierarchical, mind-numbing,
3
and, at times, downright dehumanizing. In this environment,
† J.D. University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, incoming Visiting Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. For comments on earlier manuscripts, suggestions, and feedback, I would like to thank Britton Schwartz,
David Ismay, and the faculty at the University of Kansas School of Law. Copyright © 2012 by Melissa Mortazavi.
1. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: The Legal
Profession Today, Address Before Indiana University School of Law (Sept. 12,
1986), in 62 IND. L.J. 151, 153 (1987).
2. Today, law firms are profit-driven businesses, ranked by profits per
partner. See, e.g., Rosemarie Clancy & Russell Miskiewicz, Profits Show a
Healthy Increase, AM. LAW., May 2011, at 139, 139–40. Rankings according to
gross revenue and revenue per lawyer are also available. Rosemarie Clancy &
Russell Miskiewicz, Seventeen Firms Gross More Than $1 Billion, AM. LAW.,
May 2011, at 121, 121–29; Rosemarie Clancy & Russell Miskiewicz, The Harbinger of a Recovery?, AM. LAW., May 2011, at 131, 131–37.
3. One law firm partner argued that the current billable hour system
renders associates “as interchangeable as widgets.” Niki Kuckes, The Hours:
The Short, Unhappy History of How Lawyers Bill Their Clients, LEGAL AFF.
Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 40, 40, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/
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4

attorneys are often overtired, under informed about their cas5
es, and afraid of appearing weak or incapable to superiors.
Understandably, these attorneys are frequently unable to perform to the best of their abilities or to exercise good independ6
ent judgment. The scope of the problem takes on larger and
darker dimensions when unhappy or stressed lawyers become
7
ethical liabilities. In adopting an increasingly profit-driven
8
business model that mirrors that of their clients, lawyers have
adopted a model that is fundamentally at odds with their pro9
fessional obligations. Although the legal profession attempts to
compensate for these tensions through increasingly detailed
ethical rules, the fact remains that workplace mistreatment of
lawyers creates a system that marginalizes professional
responsibility.
This Article argues that labor issues and ethical issues in
the legal profession are inherently intertwined. Despite the
widespread acknowledgment of tensions between how private
September-October-2002/review_kuckes_sepoct2002.msp; see also Eli Wald,
Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes,
and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2245, 2283 (2010) (arguing that the emphasis on “around-the-clock commitment to the firm” exacerbates already prevalent stereotypes regarding the female lawyer’s inherent under-commitment to the firm).
4. See Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on
the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 182 (2005) (reporting that 3% of surveyed attorneys sleep less than five hours per night and
35.7% sleep five to six hours per night).
5. See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the
Elite Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 705, 743 (1998) (arguing that young attorneys do not receive the opportunity to “slowly learn their craft” and instead are pressured to “hit the
ground running”).
6. See Fortney, supra note 4 (concluding that overtired attorneys may
not be operating at “peak performance”).
7. Claude Solnik, Stressed-out, Overworked Lawyers Lead to Disciplinary
Actions by State Bar, ALLBUSINESS (Aug. 19, 2005), http://www.allbusiness
.com/north-america/united-states-new-york/1083441-1.html (reporting on the
correlation between stress and overwork on the ethical practice of lawyering in
terms of client availability, substantive work product, judgment, and financial
integrity).
8. See David B. Wilkins, Partner Shmartner! EEOC v. Sidley Austin
Brown and Wood, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1273 (2007) (noting that “[t]he prevailing wisdom is that only ‘business-like’ firms that successfully organize
themselves in ways that parallel their business clients will survive in today’s
competitive marketplace”).
9. See Rehnquist, supra note 1, at 154 (“[E]thical considerations . . . are
factors which counsel against maximization of income in the best Adam Smith
tradition . . . .”).
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practice is conducted and the values lawyers hold, the issue of
how to remedy legal ethics is misunderstood and often analyzed
on a rule-by-rule basis. This approach avoids the core of the
problem, which is systemic and, thus, requires a systemic
solution.
The first innovation of this Article is to import and apply
11
new institutionalism, a theory widely used in economics and
political science, to legal practice. Applying this theory to law
reveals that the ethical crisis at the heart of the current private
practice system is an institutional and systemic flaw. The inevitable tension between the conscious acts (or inaction) of individual lawyers and the institutional norms of private practice
that facilitate unethical behavior has led to an ethical crisis. By
approaching these circumstances from a new institutionalist
perspective, one can begin to craft meaningful and workable solutions to restore professionalism, agency, and integrity to the
legal workplace. The question changes from, “how can individual lawyers act ethically?” to “how do lawyers change firms as
institutions to support or compel ethical behavior?”
This Article further argues that only a structural change in
firm institutions—a seismic shift—can reorder the legal workplace into one conducive to professionally responsible practice.
Past solutions—such as piecemeal amendments to the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Mod12
el Rules), or relying on firms and individuals to self-police—
are ineffective. Similarly, banishing the billable hour is neither
pragmatic nor likely. Agreements between lawyers regarding
10. See generally Fortney, supra note 4, at 178 (discussing how high billable hour requirements may incentivize inefficiency and dishonest time records); Robert E. Hirshon, Law and the Billable Hour: A Standard Developed in
the 1960s May Be Damaging Our Profession, 88 A.B.A. J. 10, 10 (2002) (“Mentoring, life-balance, workplace stimulation and innovation are affected when
the timesheet reigns.”).
11. See generally Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27 COMP. POL. 231, 232 (1995) (describing various
forms of new institutionalism, but acknowledging that they all “share a concern for the role of institutions in social science”).
12. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT (2010). The Model
Rules devote an entire section to decoding the basic principles of professional
responsibility in the context of a law firm. See id. R. 5.1–5.8. This alone recognizes the innate difficulty and quagmire of ethical contortions that the bar
must go through in order to facilitate law practiced in firms. But the fact is,
improved working conditions for the attorneys practicing at law firms would
do more to ameliorate ethical issues than creating complex rules. Improved
working conditions would attack the root of the problem and the structure of
legal work at firms.
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pay are antitrust violations. Labor discussions between individual lawyers and their firms reveal extreme leverage inequalities, lack enforceability, and are subject to client and economic
pressures to be competitive with other firms. As such, this Article proposes the most effective remaining alternative: privatesector attorneys must unionize, not only to change their own
lives and working conditions, but to uphold their ethical obligations as lawyers.
Unionization is the only option that will allow privatesector attorneys the ability to transcend the institutional norms
of firms and neutralize some of the market forces at play in the
current system. Any change to firm labor practices needs to be
relatively uniform across firms because: (1) clients may shop
around for firms that are more willing to exploit labor or that
are nonparticipants in informal labor agreements; (2) even
were this not the case, the threat of losing clients will prevent
partners from supporting labor changes unless competitors are
bound to the same terms; and (3) if all attorneys in the sector
are bound by the same general terms of employment then how
law is practiced will change—partners will have leverage to
“push back” on clients, the government, and potential adversaries for things like reasonable work deadlines. Unionization
legally allows attorneys across firms to make the demands necessary to reform the profession and empowers associates, staff
attorneys and partners to fundamentally change how private
law is practiced. Time management, good decision making and
prioritization, and quality over quantity become the central focuses of effective practice.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I applies the theory of new institutionalism to law firms and reframes longstanding and emerging ethical and labor issues embedded in firms’
current work structures. Part II outlines in greater detail the
specific ethical rules undermined by current firm practices.
Part III discusses other possible solutions to the ethical issues
presented and concludes that non-unionization options are illegal, limited, or ineffective. Lastly, Part IV outlines the legality
and ethics of unionization for attorneys and concludes that unionization is the best way to address the ethical and labor issues pertaining to private-sector lawyers.

13. See infra Part III.E (discussing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Superior Court
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)).
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I. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF
THE MODERN LAW FIRM
A. THE THEORY: NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
“In the majority of situations, rules and procedures (that is,
institutions) are clearly established, and individuals follow routines. They follow well-worn paths and do what they think is
14
expected of them.”
The theory of “new institutionalism,” frequently applied in
modern economics, political science, and sociology, provides an
important framework for understanding why lawyers at law
firms do not, and will not, change their working conditions as
individuals despite the obvious negative ethical implications of
15
their work structure. Broadly speaking, new institutionalism
conceptualizes institutions not as specific groups of people or
physical places, but as dynamic sets of formal and informal
16
rules. These rules may take the form of behaviors, customs,
17
symbols, patterns of thought, or conventional wisdom. New
institutionalism posits that, whatever form they take, these
rules frame—or supersede—conscious decision making and
18
structure human interactions. Under this theory, institutions
14. Koelble, supra note 11, at 233.
15. There are three branches of new institutionalism: rational choice, historical, and sociological. This Article will focus on the sociological branch of
new institutionalism. For discussion of the distinctions, see generally Peter A.
Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 44 POL. STUD. 936, 950–55 (1996) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of the three types of new institutionalism); Koelble, supra note 11
(identifying major differences between rational choice, historical, and sociological new institutionalism).
16. See B. GUY PETERS, INSTITUTIONAL THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE:
THE “NEW INSTITUTIONALISM” 28–29 (1999); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W.
Powell, Introduction to THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS 1, 1–3 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
17. See JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 22 (1989) (“By ‘rules’ we mean
the routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms,
and technologies around which political activity is constructed.”).
18. See WENDELL GORDON, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: THE CHANGING
SYSTEM 16 (1980) (“[A]n institution is a grouping of people with some common
behavior patterns, its members having an awareness of the grouping. But in
this definition the emphasis is on the institutional behavior pattern. It is not
especially helpful to reify institutions in the sense of thinking of them as
buildings or groups of people. . . . So, the essence of the institutions is the
commonly held behavior pattern.”); Thráinn Eggertsson, A Note on the Economics of Institutions, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 6, 6–
7 (Lee J. Alston et al. eds., 1996) (asserting that institutional rules “shape
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matter because “they shape, even determine, human behavior.
Institutions come about to give legitimacy to rules of conduct
and behavior which concern power relations and the establish19
ment of social and cultural norms . . . .” Institutions keep individual actors behaving a certain way through various mechanisms of control: hierarchies, sanctions, rewards, rules, and
20
procedures. A law firm is an institution, replete with its own
set of norms, beliefs, and practices that are self-reinforcing and
21
are not imposed or enforced by any one individual.
The institution of the modern law firm did not develop in a
vacuum. Rather, it was “created or adopted in a world already
22
replete with institutions.” Because “developing new institutions ‘borrow’ from the existing world of institutional tem23
plates,” law firms internalized the business models of their
24
successful clients, and adopted a sort of Wall Street ethos. For
lawyers this is a problematic development, since the institutional structure of Wall Street cannot safeguard the duties as
lawyers. Unlike their Wall Street clients, lawyers are bound by
demanding and highly codified rules of professional responsibility and ethics that are incompatible with unmitigated profit

human interaction”); James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734, 736
(1984).
19. Koelble, supra note 11 (describing the work of MARCH & OLSEN, supra
note 17, at 23–24).
20. See Ellen M. Immergut, The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism, 26 POL. & SOC’Y 5, 5, 16 (1998), available at http://pas.sagepub.com/
content/26/1/5.full.pdf+html (arguing that “decisions cannot be understood as
macro-aggregations of individual preferences but instead result from cognitive
and organizational procedures that produce decisions despite uncertainty”);
Koelble, supra note 11, at 233 (describing the way that individual actors are
“kept in line”).
21. For example, some typical norms in the law firm are: to place firm
work above all other obligations, not to refuse additional work, not to report
poor judgment or behavior on the part of anyone in the firm to a superior or
parties outside the firm, to seek to maximize billable hours, to file every possible motion, to conduct extensive document review immediately—before being
able to target key issues—and expect immediate around-the-clock responses
using mobile devices. See infra Part I.B.1–3.
22. Hall & Taylor, supra note 15, at 953.
23. Id.
24. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 381 (2001) (discussing a shift
from conceptualizing being a lawyer as being a “guardian of the law” to a
“hired gun”).
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25

maximization. Beyond formal rules of ethics, lawyers also play
26
a broader role in safeguarding the rule of law. These distinctions are part of what makes lawyers critical actors in civil so27
ciety. By continuously asking attorneys to work under sub-par
conditions where they lack agency or are treated without respect, the institution of the firm fundamentally undermines the
ability of a lawyer to be a lawyer, a professional, and, ultimately, a responsible advocate.
So how does one change an institution with deeply ingrained norms, where individual actors are structurally constrained? “Organizations are characterized by their use of job
specification and division of labor;” as such, the structure of labor is pivotal in maintaining an institution’s hold over individ28
ual actors. Thus, a labor reform results in institutional reform
29
by providing new opportunities for individual action.
B. THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN LAW FIRM
1. The Players
The basic structure of the attorney workforce at a law firm
is a simple hierarchy: at the top are partners, who have equity;
then associates, who potentially could join the partnership
30
ranks; then staff attorneys, who do rote, repetitive work that
31
associates dislike, and for which clients hate to pay top dol25. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar,
70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1231–33 (1995) (concluding a middle-ground approach
that would continue bar admission while permitting nonlawyers to practice
law and substituting market and government regulation for self-regulation of
legal ethics is a viable alternative to standing models of practice). Even legal
scholars arguing in favor of a “business paradigm” of practice do not advocate
for a simple market based system. Id.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 6 (2010) (“[A] lawyer
should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law
and the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy
depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.”).
27. See Professionalism Symposium, 52 S.C. L. REV. 443, 490 (2001).
28. Koelble, supra note 11, at 233.
29. The very act of unionization breaks with current (unspoken) norms.
Despite the fact that attorneys play a vital role in the private sector, there has
not been serious consideration to date on unionization of the attorney workforce.
30. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF
LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 2–3 (1991) ( listing the
dichotomy between partners and associates as one of the distinctive features of
the big law firm).
31. See Peter D. Sherer & Kyungmook Lee, Institutional Change in Large
Law Firms: A Resource Dependency and Institutional Perspective, 45 ACAD.
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lar; and, at the bottom, contract attorneys, who are temporarily employed by firms on an ad hoc basis depending on a given
33
matter. Generally speaking, partners are completely at the
disposal of clients and provide round-the-clock responsiveness,
regardless of whether they are on vacation, or even giving
34
birth. Associates face other labor issues, like physically grueling travel, excessive and irregular hours, routine sleep deprivation, unclear advancement policies, and no formal layoff or job
35
severance policy.
Staff and contract attorneys have even less leverage and,
by no coincidence, have the longest list of workplace grievances.
In addition to the issues plaguing associates, staff and contract
36
attorneys face compensation issues, lack of paid leave, poor or

MGMT. J. 102, 107 (2002) (describing staff attorneys as non-partnership track
attorneys hired to perform “routine price sensitive work”).
32. Jonathan D. Glater, Billable Hours Giving Ground at Law Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1.
33. “Contract attorneys” are essentially freelance attorneys who come in
on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis, often to engage in document review. They
may work completely on their own. Alternatively, in the context of big cities, it
is more likely that they come from large agencies. For example, Black Letter
Discovery provides staff for document review, review facilities, management,
and onshore review in eight U.S. cities. Discovery Services, BLACK LETTER
DISCOVERY, http://www.blackletterdiscovery.com/services/discovery_services.php
( last visited Apr. 16, 2012); Locations, BLACK LETTER DISCOVERY, http://www
.blackletterdiscovery.com/about/bld_locations.php ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
34. Some law firm partners respond via blackberry even during labor. See
Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward
Gender Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 121 (1988).
35. See infra Part I.C.
36. Select agencies do provide benefits to workers. Benefits, COUNS. ON
CALL, http://www.counseloncall.com/Page/Benefits ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012)
(providing health benefits, holiday pay, 401(k) plans, and workers compensation insurance); Frequently Asked Questions/Attorneys, AXIOM LAW,
http://www.axiomlaw.com/index.php/whoweare/faq ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012)
(providing “health, vision, dental and malpractice insurance,” among other
benefits). However, these agencies do not view themselves as “staffing companies” providing contract attorneys, but rather, as boutique flexible firms offering the services of a variety of elite practitioners. See, e.g., Counsel on Call,
COUNS. ON CALL, http://www.counseloncall.com//images/upload/File/counsel-on
-call-fact-sheet_09.2011.pdf ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012); Frequently Asked Questions/Attorneys, supra. Note that both Counsel on Call and Axiom Law are
highly selective companies which pride themselves on providing “experts” in
the field that they are called on. This is not an option for inexperienced attorneys. See Frequently Asked Questions/Attorneys, supra. (“Nearly 75% [of Axiom attorneys] come from a top 25 school, most have worked at an AmLaw 50
or Magic Circle firm and about two-thirds have spent several years in-house
before joining the firm.”).
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unsafe working conditions, and even less job security. For experienced attorneys with highly sought after skill sets, being a
contract attorney once appeared to be a way to more favorably
38
manage work-life balance during boom times. However, for
many recent law graduates, who have no work experience, contract work through an agency is viewed as a necessary evil to
39
get experience and build a network.
2. Basis of Employment: Contracts
In terms of binding obligations, law firms generally do not
require or allow associates to sign employment contracts with
the firm. Thus, the terms of employment are fluid, with few
written rules or policies regarding job security. Lawyers at
firms, like most employees, work at will. This means that they
can be fired with or without cause and without any notice, pro40
vided their termination is not otherwise unlawful. One of the
few exceptions to this rule is that an employer may not terminate an attorney’s employment for insisting that the firm fulfill
41
its obligation to report another attorney’s misconduct.
3. How Work Is Accomplished: Billing Structures
At the core of the labor structure of the modern law firm is
the billable hour. Put simply, lawyers bill clients by how much
time they spend on a matter, rather than billing clients a set

37. Julie Kay, Contract Lawyers: Cheaper by the Hour, NAT’L L.J. (Jan. 12,
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202427395994 (reporting on the constricting job market, poor working conditions, and pressure to decrease wages).
38. Hannah Hayes, Lawyer for Hire: Freelance Contractors Change the
Marketplace, 17 PERSP. 12, 12 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/perspectives_magazine/women_perspectives_
Winter09_Freelance_Contractors.authcheckdam.pdf.
39. Id. at 13 (“In tough economic times, many law students sign up with
agencies to gain experience and network.”).
40. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc’y, 312 F. Supp. 1105, 1105–07 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (ruling that, absent a state action or membership in a union, the Legal
Aid Society could fire lawyers employed at will in response to speech); Horn v.
N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 755, 759 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining that an employer may discharge an employee “without cause or notice” so long as it does not
violate some statutory right or contract).
41. Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 638–39 (N.Y. 1992); see also Connolly
v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern L.L.P., 817 N.Y.S.2d 872, 877–78 (Sup. Ct. 2006)
(holding that an associate fired for refusing to violate DR 1-102, which imposes an obligation on attorneys not to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, stated a cause of action for breach of implied contract).
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fee per matter or by outcome. Billable hours include only
minutes billed directly to clients and not time spent on education programs, bar work, general firm activities, or simple daily
43
acts like lunch. Time in the private sector is usually measured
and billed in six minute intervals, most commonly by using
44
electronic trackers on computers. Making money under this
model is simple—more hours worked means more money
earned by the firm.
Much scholarly and professional debate has centered on
the ethics of the billable hour, and whether the billable hour is
45
a per se ethics violation remains an open debate. Regardless,
the implementation of the billable hour has, in practice, become
46
a facilitator for unethical behavior. Particularly when employee leverage is low and hour maximization is sought without factors that limit how and when those hours are attained, the eth47
ical practice of law is jeopardized. This is because without
increased leverage, lawyers who are fearful of losing their livelihood simply do not pull the institutional weight to counter the
systemic billing and client pressures. Ultimately, as long as
there is no penalty, and only benefit, to taking more time to do
a task, attorneys will abuse the billable hour system. As such,
the billable hour needs strict restrictions in order to avoid its
misuse.

42. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, ABA COMMISSION ON BILLABLE
HOURS REPORT 2001–2002 at 45 (2002), available at http://www
.judicialaccountability.org/articles/ABABillableHours2002.pdf.
43. Pro bono work is a gray area where firms differ in their approaches.
For the years of 2009 and 2010, eighty percent of firms reported counting some
pro bono work towards billable hour requirements. A Look at Associate Hours
and at Law Firm Pro Bono Programs: NALP Bulletin, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L.
PLACEMENT, tbl.4 (Apr. 2010), http://www.nalp.org/july2009hoursandprobono.
At over forty percent of firms, there is a maximum number of “billable” hours
an associate may earn towards their quota from pro bono work. Id. tbl.5. The
average number of pro bono hours credited in these years was just over seventy-two. Id. tbl.6. Under this model, law firms disregard any additional pro bono hours over the maximum number for the purposes of billable hours. Id.
44. Maxwell S. Kennerly, Sound and Fury over Flat Fees, Signifying Nothing, LITIG. & TRIAL (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.litigationandtrial.com/2011/
01/articles/the-business-of-law/the-long-view/sound-and-fury-over-flat-fees
-signifying-nothing/.
45. See, e.g., Scott Turow, The Billable Hour Must Die, 93 A.B.A. J. 32,
34 –35 (2007), available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_
billable_hour_must_die/.
46. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note 42, at 53.
47. Id.
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C. TENSION BETWEEN QUALITY AND QUANTITY
Robert Hirshon, the former President of the American Bar
Association, observed, “[t]he billable hour is fundamentally
48
about quantity over quality, repetition over creativity.” Not
surprisingly, then, the labor structure that has emerged from
the unchecked use of the billable hour is one that places overwhelming incentives on attorneys as individuals to maximize
the hours they and the firm bill.
As a matter of course, most law firms have a “billable
hours target” or “requirement” that sets forth how many hours
49
firm attorneys should bill in a given year. This target and the
amount associates bill are usually integral to compensation
50
(through the bonus structure) and performance evaluations.
The billable system “creat[es] a pecking order among lawyers,
51
identifying the best as the busiest and the most costly.” In
1958, the ABA’s target work year was 1300 hours of work for
52
attorneys. This equated to less than five to six billable hours
53
in day, five days a week in a forty-eight week year. As of 2001,
that amount has ballooned by 1000 hours a year, with the ABA
recommending work hour expectations of 2300 hours annually,
54
1900 of which would be billable. Those expectations are conservative when compared to practice; many law firms require
55
between 1900 and 2200 billable hours a year.
48. Hirshon, supra note 10.
49. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note 42. While partners
are not usually subject to hard hours targets, they are under considerable
pressure to bring in as much money as possible. Therefore, cases that will be
hour intensive (such as matters involving heavy document discovery) weigh
heavily in comparison to standard or smaller matters. Partners are also under
pressure to bill directly, which contributes to their overall financial worth to
the firm. Id. at 43.
50. Fortney, supra note 4, at 175.
51. Glater, supra note 32.
52. Ronda Muir, A Short History of the Billable Hour and the Consequences of Its Tyranny, LAW PEOPLE (June 18, 2007), http://www.lawpeopleblog
.com/2007/06/articles/profitability/a-short-history-of-the-billable-hour-and-the
-consequences-of-its-tyranny/.
53. Id. This is based on the assumption that all 1300 hours recommended
by the ABA in 1958 would be billable under today’s standards. Id.
54. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note 42, at 50. These hours
would be “composed of 1900 hours billable to clients plus a total of 400 additional hours for: firm service (100 hours), pro bono (100 hours), client development (75 hours), training and professional development (75 hours)
and professional service (50 hours).” Muir, supra note 52.
55. Fortney, supra note 4, at 175; Kuckes, supra note 3, at 41 (reporting
that required billable hours in 2001 were 1950–2000 hours per year on aver-
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Because many activities do not count towards billable
hours requirements, it is commonly estimated that three hours
56
of work time roughly equates to two hours of billable time.
Therefore, to bill 2000 hours in a year, a typical lawyer will
57
need to work 3000 hours. A simple calculation reveals that the
system, as it stands, expects law firm associates to work twelve
58
to fourteen hour days consistently throughout the year. Two
thousand hours is hardly the upper limit in the profession, as
lawyers in big cities admit to billing upwards of 3000 hours in a
59
given year. This equates to an inhuman twelve hours a day,
seven days a week, or a seventeen hour workday over a five-day
60
workweek.
With such enormous labor requirements, the incentive to
be inefficient, inflate hours, and cut participation in profession61
al activities is obvious. Indeed, an associate has no incentive
to work efficiently because when work is finished quickly it is
only replaced with more work to continue to maximize hours.
In order to have time to sleep or to maintain a personal life—let
alone have time to enjoy a weekend or vacation—law firm law-

age); Robert Lennon, The Memo Heard Round the World, AM. LAW., Dec. 2002,
at 19 (confirming with a Clifford Chance representative that the firm set a
2200 hour “target,” while encouraging associates to spend time outside client
billable hours); Memorandum from Clifford Chance Associates to Clifford
Chance Parnters, (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.lawcost.com/
clifchancememo.htm (reporting that Clifford Chance required 2200 hours of
“hard billable” work and 220 hours of “soft billable” time); Number of Associate
Hours Worked Declines, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT, tbl.3 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.nalp.org/assoc_hrs_feb2011 (reporting that a 2007 NALP study reported that over sixty percent of law firms require 1900 billable hours or more
of work per year).
56. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 42 (citing the 2:3 ratio); William G. Ross,
Kicking the Unethical Billing Habit, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2199, 2203 (1998)
(noting experts approximate one-third of office time is “typically consumed by
non-billable activities”); Muir, supra note 52 (explaining that the standard
guideline is that it takes “approximately 10–12 hours to bill 8 hours”).
57. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 42.
58. See id. These numbers are based on a five-day workweek with fortyeight weeks per year and are rounded to the nearest whole hour. Id.
59. Glater, supra note 32, at A18.
60. Id. The phrase “five-day work week” is laughable amongst law firm
associates who rarely spend an entire weekend not working. See Kuckes, supra note 3, at 42.
61. Kuckes, supra note 3 (“The standard [of using quantity of time worked
over quality of output] invites inefficiency, not to mention fraud.”); Rehnquist,
supra note 1.
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yers must find ways to bill more time in less time. This starts
with what may seem like relatively innocent multitasking or
time management techniques to maximize the number of hours
billed. But these practices can easily escalate to outright
63
fraud. Common examples of this problem include: reading, editing, or responding to emails while commuting; doing work for
client A while billing travel time for client B; responding or reviewing work via mobile device for client A while in a team
meeting for client B; being on a call for client A while doing
computer-based research, document review, or writing for cli64
ent B. Furthermore, because each individual lawyer is constantly multitasking in an attempt to find enough hours in the
day, they cannot be focused lawyers; their work will inevitably
suffer in both content and judgment. However poor the work
product, it still counts towards billable hours, though. To catch
the errors arising out of such an arrangement, firms build in
65
substantial redundancies.
No party, even at the top, escapes the institutional pressure to bill and the fear of losing client work. Partners themselves have been found guilty of fraud, disbarred, or resigned
66
over bill padding. Partners must increase revenue in order to
67
68
increase firm rankings, maintain client relations, secure
62. See Fortney, supra note 4, at 177–78 (discussing how associates are
rewarded for billing more time and how sources in a NALP survey regarded
bill padding as widespread).
63. See Ross, supra note 56, at 2204 –05.
64. Id. In addition, since the minimal interval for billing a client is six
minutes, attorneys may make several very short phone calls for different clients, counting each as a full six minutes. Some parties take to writing down
their time manually, rather than using the electronic timer, which makes
their time accumulate faster. At a minimum, they are recording time by the
minute, not the second, and at maximum, this method encourages rounding
errors. See Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable
Hours, and Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 228 (2000).
65. See Richmond, supra note 64, at 230–33. Very little written or produced at a firm is the product of any one person—on the contrary, many people and hundreds of hours are devoted to reviewing and revising any given
document. Id.
66. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 42 (noting that partners at Rose Law Firm;
McDermott, Will & Emery; Latham & Watkins; Mayer, Brown & Platt; and
Hunton & Williams have all engaged in corrupt billing practices).
67. See Rosemarie Clancy & Russell Miskiewicz, Profits Show a Healthy
Increase, AM. LAW., May 2011, at 139, 139–40. (indicating that big law firms
are ranked, at least in part, by profits per partner).
68. It is a common perception that firm rankings factor heavily into client
decisions on representation in “bet the company” scenarios, so no law firm
wants to step out of the rat race. See, e.g., Sheila Livadas, Opinions Mixed on
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70

their own job stability, pay firm costs, and receive better
71
compensation. As such, they have few incentives to push back
on unreasonable client demands or expectations. Although
partners can be hit hardest by general pressures in the legal
services industry—particularly in terms of client responsiveness—they also feel powerless to change the current system of
mounting hours, billing pressures, twenty-four-hour availabil72
ity, and quantity of work over quality.
Billable time is inflated not by any one of these actions, but
73
by its collective impact on firm culture. It is the institutional
practice created by the combination of internal and external
pressures on firm lawyers that waylays ethical practice. Law
firm culture has few, if any, checks on the amount of time a
74
person can bill in a given day or week. Firm norms place little
relative value on the exercise of skill, individual action, or creativity. Because law firms pride themselves on being “client
driven,” an outside agent is viewed as controlling the terms of
work, giving the institution its own life and trajectory, and absolving individuals of both agency and culpability. The norms
and practices in the industry leave individuals feeling powerless within their field of influence. For example, associates feel
unable to change their team or firm dynamics, and partners
Local Impact of Magazine Law-Firm Rankings, ROCHESTER BUS. J. (Apr. 30,
2010), http://www.rbj.net/print_article.asp?aID=183880.
69. See Julie Creswell & Karen Donovan, Happy Birthday. Vacate Your
Office, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, at C1.
70. Partners often blame the pressure to bill on rising associate salaries.
See Fortney, supra note 4, at 172.
71. Recent trends indicate that law firms have moved away from lockstep
models of compensation—where compensation increases with seniority—and
turned to models based on other factors, particularly income generated for the
firm. Leaving Lockstep: Moving Toward Competency-Based Compensation, AM.
LAW INST.-AM. BAR ASS’N (July 29, 2009), http://www.ali-aba.org/index.cfm?
fuseaction=courses.course&course_code=RWRM01.
72. Kuckes, supra note 3 (“The benefits of seniority rarely include the opportunity to work less—only the most successful rainmakers are exempt from
the pressure to bill time. . . . ‘It’s like a pie-eating contest where first prize is
all the pie you can eat.’”).
73. Cf. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV.
871, 910–15 (1999) (describing big firm culture that challenges the ethical
practice of law).
74. But see Kay Holmen, The 95-Hour Day—Or the Need for Billing Scrutiny, KNAPP PETERSEN CLARKE (Spring 2006), http://www.kpclegal.com/
publications/billing-scrutiny.php (noting that “most billing programs have automatic safeguards which will not allow a timekeeper to bill more than 24
hours a day”).
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feel powerless in the greater legal market versus other firms.
Despite the obvious downfalls of the current system, “law firms
76
seem to have neither the ability nor the will” to change.
D. OTHER CULTURAL FACTORS
Several other common practices create an institutional culture at modern law firms that undermines ethical behavior. For
77
example, norms regarding the importance of hierarchy, work78
79
er fungibility, a lack of transparency in cases, pride in ex80
treme overwork, and passive aggressive management all converge to create a poor working environment for lawyers—and
poor lawyers for clients. Indeed, sleep deprivation is often
borne with grudging pride as it provides the illusion of being
81
important or indispensable. These may seem like flexible
norms, but they are not. Every lawyer at a firm knows that he
or she needs to follow the chain of command. Every big law associate knows that he or she may be fired at any time and that
82
his or her chances of joining the partnership are low. Some
argue that lawyers in this context function as little more than

75. Partners recognize the ethical tensions at play in this system but are
equally trapped by the institutional pressures placed on their roles. See Fortney, supra note 4, at 179 n.35 (citing comments by a Chicago partner stating,
“I think the profession would be better served and I think clients would be better served if [tying salaries to mandatory annual hours’ requirements] became
an unethical practice”).
76. Kuckes, supra note 3, at 43.
77. Erin J. Cox, Comment, An Economic Crisis is a Terrible Thing to
Waste: Reforming the Business of a Law for a Sustainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 511, 529 (2009).
78. Id. at 513.
79. See, e.g., id. at 548–49 (discussing how increased transparency benefits clients).
80. See, e.g., Career Center Survey Results: Who Worked on Thanksgiving
Day?, ABOVE THE LAW (Dec. 1, 2011, 5:22 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/
12/career-center-survey-results-who-worked-on-thanksgiving-day/ (noting percentages of attorneys who worked on various holidays, including a noteworthy
seventy-three percent of attorneys who worked on Presidents’ Day).
81. Cynthia Hsu, Some Busy Lawyers Sleeping in on Site, Japanese-Style
Sleeping Pods, FindLaw (Aug. 8, 2011, 8:29 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/
greedy_associates/2011/08/some-busy-lawyers-sleeping-in-on-site-japanese-style
-sleeping-pods.html.
82. Cf. Julie Kay, Making Partner Gets Tougher, LAW.COM (Sept. 29,
2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202517268513&slreturn=1 (describing more obstacles to making partner).
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paralegals, and that a law degree, while nice, is not strictly
83
required.
Under this model, the client hires the partner and is relatively uninvolved in the subsequent staffing. It is often taken
as a given that individual attorneys will not know the overall
strategy for the cases they are assigned to, will focus exclusively on assigned finite tasks, and will not question the scope or
manner of the execution of such tasks. As exhausted as most
firm attorneys will get, they will not admit to superiors that
they need to work fewer hours and will often brag about how
84
many late nights they spent at the office the previous week. If
a superior asks an inferior what he or she is doing over the
85
weekend, the inferior is expected to volunteer availability. The
86
general expectation is that there is a seven-day workweek.
The workplace culture at firms also isolates firm lawyers,
impeding camaraderie. Lawyers in other sectors are generally
viewed as weak, disorganized, less accomplished, and less
committed to their clients. A way of showing strength in firm
culture is to work inhuman hours and still win. To exacerbate
the issue, non-firm lawyers tend to show disdain for those
working in the private sector, whom they may view as overpaid, soulless, spoiled egomaniacs who have a bottomless well
87
of support to draw upon.
In the end, these workplace norms lead to teams of unbalanced lawyers who (1) hate or resent clients or each other; (2)
are overworked and tired yet are unwilling to recognize how
this limits their abilities; (3) have no loyalty to their firm or its
clients; and (4) have no sense of pride in being part of a legal
profession. This creates an institutional environment rife with
motivation and opportunities for poor lawyering.

83. Pearce, supra note 25, at 1268–70 (arguing that under a business paradigm model of practice, nonlawyers should also be allowed to provide legal
services).
84. ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 80.
85. See Will Meyerhofer, Frying Pan, THE PEOPLE’S THERAPIST (Jan. 18,
2012), http://thepeoplestherapist.com/2012/01/18/frying-pan/.
86. See, e.g., ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 80.
87. See, e.g., Sara Rimer, Revealing the Soul of a Soulless Lawyer, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/
26/fashion/26BLOG.html#.
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II. APPLYING NEW INSTITUTIONALISM: THE SPECIFIC
ETHICAL RULES IMPLICATED BY LAW FIRM PRACTICE
Having outlined the basic structural framework of the
modern law firm, this Part presents an overview of the major
88
legal ethical issues implicated by current law firm practice.
Specifically, it examines a lawyer’s duty to his or her client to
inform the client, and to act with loyalty, confidentiality, competence, diligence, promptness, and financial integrity respecting the client’s affairs. This Part closes with a brief discussion
of professionalism and the duty to the profession.
A. DUTY TO THE CLIENT
At the core of professional responsibility is the duty and
89
privilege of a lawyer to be an advisor to one’s client. In order
to effectively tackle this role, the rules of professional responsibility enumerate more specific sub-duties that build the requi90
site trust a lawyer needs to be an effective advisor.
1. Competence
As an initial matter, a client expects her lawyer, at mini91
mum, to be competent. As the Model Rules require, “A lawyer
shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representa92
tion.” The legal competence of a junior lawyer is predicated on
93
good supervision and mentoring. The current system cannot
sustain a consistent level of competency, since supervising attorneys are unable to provide the oversight needed to either

88. This Article will focus on the Model Rules, their accompanying comments, and the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)
in discussing general rules of professional responsibility. The Model Rules
have been adopted in full or in part by almost every state and represent the
majority rule. Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. CTR. OF
PROF’L RESP., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_
adopting_model_rules.html ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2 (2010).
90. See, e.g., id. R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.6 (detailing a lawyer’s responsibility to be
competent, diligent, and to keep confidences).
91. See id. R. 1.1.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Professional Development, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER &
FELD L.L.P., http://www.akingump.com/careers/attorneys/development/ ( last
visited Apr. 16, 2012).
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cultivate competence or take comprehensive corrective
measures.
For a number of reasons, the billable hour system does not
reward training. First, partners and associates are valued pri94
marily by the income or prestige they generate. Second, mentoring and teaching is not billable. Third, partners and associates are already short on time for their billable work and
themselves. Thus, mentoring falls to the wayside. Formal lawyer-skills training, often used to satisfy continuing legal education requirements, can include valuable stand up advocacy or
95
writing workshops. However without meaningful mentorship
and application to actual work, such programs function more as
homage to what lawyering once was, as opposed to preparing
attorneys for what lawyering currently is. Under these circumstances, time spent training associates on traditional lawyering
skills often seems unnecessary at best, and a cruel tease at
worst.
Firm hierarchy also undermines competence. Cases are
96
staffed in a pyramid structure. This leaves junior associates
supervising large teams of contract attorneys, often in matters
97
that they have never handled before. While junior associates
educate themselves, they are given too many subordinates to
effectively oversee detailed work. Because the basic workforce
is made up of junior associates (who are increasingly transitory) and contract attorneys (who may not be at the firm the next
time such a project arrives) training is minimal and often confined to a brief opening memo and answering questions on an
98
ad hoc basis. There is little or no methodology to structuring
99
cases or large document reviews. Although thoroughness on
94. See Schiltz, supra note 73, at 915.
95. See AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD L.L.P., supra note 93.
96. See Law Firm Partners Handling Larger Share of Work in Deleveraging Trend, ALM.COM (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.alm.com/pressroom/2011/12/13/
law-firm-partners-handling-larger-share-of-work-in-deleveraging-trend-according
-to-alm-legal-intelligence-survey-of-law-firm-staffing-models/.
97. Cf. Robert Hilson, Contract Attorneys Question Standards Top Law
Firms Follow in Document Review Training and Supervision, DOCUMENT REVIEW ENTER., INC. (July 20, 2011), http://www.documentreviewenterprise
.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9:contract-attorneys
-question-standards-top-law-firms-follow-in-document-review-training-and
-supervision&catid=8:articles&Itemid=95 (noting an associate is often supervisor of review).
98. See, e.g., Profile of Legal Career Changes, ATTORNEYJOBS.COM (2011),
http://attorneyjobs.com/cm/careerdev/jdpreferred/profileoflegalcareerchanges.
99. But see id. (describing a three-tier document review system).
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the part of the supervisor can compensate for some of this lack
of expertise, it must be thoroughness combined with accuracy.
2. Diligence
A lawyer also owes his or her client a duty of diligence; he
or she must be thorough and steadfast in the pursuit of his or
100
her client’s needs. This duty is alluded to in Model Rule 1.1
101
as “thoroughness,” and more specifically addressed in Model
Rule 1.3 as diligence: “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable dili102
gence and promptness in representing a client.” Diligence is
undermined when poor working conditions thwart best efforts
to be detail-oriented. For example, physical conditions that are
cramped and poorly lit, excessive travel, poor conceptual understanding of a case, and working too many hours in any given
day or week lead to generally low morale and poor performance. The human mind is simply unable to concentrate and
103
function effectively when overstressed or without sleep. The
104
physical work conditions impact stress levels. Particularly
during intensive fact discovery, attorneys may be placed in
dimly lit rooms with no natural light, reviewing paper and elec105
tronic documents elbow-to-elbow with other attorneys. Travelling around the clock through many time zones disrupts sleep
patterns and can lead to insomnia, gastrointestinal problems,
106
and depression.
Medical studies have shown that functioning without sufficient sleep impairs judgment, memory, and other cognitive
107
functions, and can severely impact work functions. Even “a
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010).
101. Id. R. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
102. Id. R. 1.3.
103. See, e.g., Steven W. Lockley et al., Effect of Reducing Interns’ Weekly
Work Hours on Sleep and Attentional Failures, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1829,
1835 (2004).
104. Jacqueline C. Vischer, The Effects of the Physical Environment on Job
Performance: Towards a Theoretical Model of Workspace Stress, 23 STRESS &
HEALTH 175, 175 (2007).
105. Solnik, supra note 7.
106. Jet Lag and Shift Work, DIV. OF SLEEP MED., HARV. MED. SCH. (Dec.
18, 2007), http://healthysleep.med.harvard.edu/healthy/science/variations/jet
-lag-and-shift-work.
107. See, e.g., Lockley et al., supra note 103, at 1834 –35; Brain Activity is
Visibly Altered Following Sleep Deprivation, UNIV. OF CAL., SAN DIEGO (Feb.
9, 2000), http://health.ucsd.edu/news/2000/2000_02_09_sleep.html.
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reduction in sleep of only 1.5 hours per night for one night
108
alone can result in a decrease in daytime alertness by 32%.”
In particular, “executive functions” such as assessing risk and
consequences, adapting to changing environments, engaging in
complex and creative decision making, multitasking, and
providing innovative solutions are all impaired by relatively
109
minor sleep loss. These are core functions of an attorney, yet
they are physically compromised in the current institutional
structure. These skills are further undermined by the fact that
attorneys in the firm context may only have the most basic un110
derstanding of the case as they approach their work. All of
these factors in combination place the duty of diligence on tentative footing; when an attorney is overtired, unhappy, and under-trained, the attorney makes mistakes—both technical and
in judgment—and the duty to be diligent is undermined.
3. Exercising Independent Judgment As an Advisor
Although one of the more amorphous standards, a lawyer’s
ability to exercise independent judgment is one of the most important duties a lawyer owes a client, the court, and the profes111
sion. It is this judgment that makes a lawyer a professional
112
with expertise to offer a client. Without exercising judgment
and advising, a lawyer is merely an access point for legal information that could readily be gleaned from a book, the Inter113
net, or a practice guide. Reflecting this importance, Model
Rule 2.1 states that, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall
exercise independent professional judgment and render candid
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law
but to other considerations, such as moral, economic, social and
114
political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”
Success as an advisor is contingent on the marriage of skills with
meticulous factual and legal analysis. Thus, the institutional factors that undermine competency and diligence also fundamentally undercut an attorney’s ability to act as an independent judge

108. Vicki Culpin & Angela Whelan, The Wake-up Call for Sleepy Managers, ASHRIDGE J., 2009, at 1–2.
109. Id. at 2.
110. See supra Part II.A.1.
111. See MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1980) (“A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client.”).
112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010).
113. See, e.g., id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2.
114. Id. R. 2.1.
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and advisor. The aforementioned cognitive impairments from
115
sleep deprivation are particularly problematic.
The ability to fulfill professional advising obligations is further undermined by the internal culture of hierarchy at law
firms. This culture does not usually provide an outlet for junior
members to express views on issues requiring judgment, much
less allow them to take action upon them. Non-partners often
116
have very limited client contact. Although an associate may
be solicited for her views on a finite issue in the form of an advisory memo to the partner, their judgment is rarely independ117
ent. Usually, such memos are tailored to preexisting goals
and issues raised by the partners, and partners make decisions
as to what information is passed on to the client. The strong
culture of conformity to hierarchy prevents an associate from
raising any concerns directly with the client.
4. Duty to Inform
The duty to inform is central to the integrity of the lawyer118
client relationship. Without it, clients are unable to meaning119
fully participate in their own representation. Model Rule
1.4(b), governing client communication, states that, “A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the rep120
resentation.” In the current work structure, a lack of understanding of the whole case and of input into case management
means that few attorneys, if any, are in a position to truly inform themselves of the issues in a case—much less in a position
to inform the client. The only person who theoretically may
have all the knowledge and facts necessary to inform the client
is the overseeing partner. However, while the partner may be
well informed of the law, he or she is completely dependent on
associates, staff, and contract attorneys to parse, relay, and
discern relevant information.

115. Culpin & Whelan, supra note 108, at 2.
116. But see First Year Associates, CURTIS, MALLET-PREVOST, COLT &
MOSLE L.L.P., http://www.curtis.com/sitecontent.cfm?pageid=26 ( last visited
Apr. 16, 2012) (advertising early client contact for junior associates).
117. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (indicating subordinate lawyers have responsibility to act in accordance with professional rules
that emphasize independent judgment).
118. See, e.g., id. R. 1.4.
119. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 1.
120. Id. R. 1.4( b).
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The fact finders’ unawareness of the true dimensions of the
case compromises their abilities to bring pertinent facts to
light. As an initial matter, successful fact-finding is dependent
on an accurate encapsulation of the issues in a matter at the
outset of discovery. Though they may be provided with copies of
the relevant pleadings, few if any junior attorneys analyze or
121
make these legal determinations themselves. Rather, associates, staff, and contract attorneys rely on superiors such as
partners and senior associates to tell them what facts are rele122
vant and what major legal arguments the firm plans to make.
However, initially anticipated concerns may not turn out to be
the actual issues the case turns upon, particularly if certain issues come to light during discovery. As such, the system is often only effective if considerable re-reviewing of documents
happens later. Due to turnover, such review may be done by a
whole new team of attorneys who do not know the case, facts or
documents at all.
Even if the attorneys do know which issues and facts to
pull from the information available, the conditions of review
make it virtually impossible to do so accurately: fact finders are
not able to carefully and analytically review. This is particularly likely in scenarios where junior lawyers are often multitasking to make more hours billable, may lack interest in, or even
resent, their clients, or where they are unfocused simply because they are tired and it is late. As such, it may be that no attorney on a given case has an accurate understanding of the
facts and law needed to inform the client of their choices or po123
tential conflicts.
5. Duty of Loyalty
a. Conflicts with Other Clients
Of all the duties a lawyer owes to a client, the Model Rules
124
focus most heavily on the duty of loyalty. One Comment to
Model Rule 1.7 lists loyalty and independent judgment as es-

121. See, e.g., Kate Neville, Why Associates Bail out of Law Firm Life—and
Why It Matters, AMHERST COLLEGE (Nov. 14, 2007), https://www.amherst
.edu/alumni/connect/networks/lawyersnetwork/careerplanning/www.amherst.e
du_lawyers_associatesbail (discussing the lack of decision-making authority
attorneys have until they advance to partner).
122. See, e.g., id.
123. See supra Part II.A.1. This point also goes to the issue of competency.
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.18.
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sential elements in the lawyer’s relationship to a client. However, lawyers cannot be loyal to their clients—which is to say
without conflict amongst and with their clients—when they are
uninformed of the issues in a case or have conflicting personal
126
interests. In the context of a modern law firm, lawyers and
supervisors often do not have enough information to be aware
127
of conflicts and make reasonable assessments. Also, when a
lawyer’s very livelihood is in tension with a broad understanding of what is a conflict, that lawyer is likely to interpret conflicts narrowly.
Generally, the Model Rules do not excuse breaches of loyal128
ty for ignorance. The general principles governing the Model
Rules’ articulation of the duty of loyalty place the burden of
finding conflicts on the lawyer: “a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and
practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation mat129
ters the persons and issues involved.”
The general law firm response to finding conflicts in a rapidly shifting workforce with fluid caseloads has been to create a
“conflicts check” procedure to vet new matters. A lawyer submits a “conflicts check request” where he or she lists parties involved in the matter, adverse or not. An administrative department, not necessarily staffed by lawyers, runs a search
through the files of the firm for the listed parties. Once a new
matter passes this conflicts’ check, a partner or senior associate
usually signs off on the conflict check. This mechanical search,
while a necessity, regularly catches only the most obvious and
glaring conflicts.
After this step, the partner or senior associate delegates
responsibility for conflicts to the junior associates, contract attorneys, and staff attorneys who are instructed to raise con-

125. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1.
126. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2).
127. But see id. R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (indicating that law firms should have appropriate procedures to identify the persons and issues involved so as to determine whether conflicts of interest exist).
128. See id. (“Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such [reasonable]
procedures will not excuse a lawyer’s violation of this Rule.”). Thus, an individual lawyer may still be responsible for such oversight if the firm’s procedures are found unreasonable. Id.
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3.
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130

flicts “as they arise” over the course of fact-finding. Here, the
institutional nature of a large firm and its work structure is all
important; this system makes it virtually impossible for any
associate, staff attorney, or contract attorney to be aware of the
other matters the firm is handling or even the scope of the rep131
They simply do not know who or what is
resentation.
132
important.
For the associate, the task of identifying and flagging such
potential client conflicts is more plausible, but still quite lim133
ited. Associates also rarely have the entire relevant picture.
Some may have been employed with the firm for a short time.
Others may have only worked on a limited number of matters
in a very specific capacity. Of course, if they have been with the
firm longer and are privy to more high-end discussions, associates may have actual knowledge of potential conflicts. Moreover, because of their place in the firm hierarchy, associates may
feel more comfortable pointing out an ethical issue to a superi134
or. Nevertheless, on an individual level, these lawyers are often ignorant of unanticipated conflicts that arise in the course
135
of litigation.
The task of identifying conflicts on an ongoing basis is even
more difficult, perhaps impossible, for the staff and contract at136
torneys who do the bulk of early fact gathering. Firms deliberately give these attorneys limited access to knowledge of other firm matters to avoid additional potential conflicts and
130. For a discussion of the ethical implications of conflict checking, see
generally Paul R. Tremblay, Migrating Lawyers and the Ethics of Conflict
Checking, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489 (2006).
131. Cf. James M. Fischer, Large Law Firm Lateral Hire Conflicts Checking: Professional Duty Meets Actual Practice, 36 J. LEGAL PROFESSION 167,
174 –78 (2011) (discussing the presumption that “what the lawyer knows, the
entire firm knows”).
132. See, e.g., id.
133. See supra Part II.A.4.
134. See Carolyn Elefant, The Secret Life of Contract Lawyers, LAW.COM,
(Nov. 8, 2007, 4:31 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/
2007/11/the-secret-life.html (exemplifying the hierarchical relationship between staff attorneys and contract attorneys by referencing an incident in
which staff attorneys rebuked contract attorneys for typing too loudly).
135. See Robert C. Rodriguez, Ethics Opinion 352 Stresses Risks Associated
with Temporary Attorneys, A.B.A. (Apr. 29, 2010), http://apps.americanbar.org/
litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/042810-ethics-confidentiality-contractattorneys.html (noting the ethical risks associated with temporary attorneys).
136. See id. (noting that some firms use “safeguards to ensure the contract
attorney does not have access to the firm’s client confidential information except for the specific matter on which the contract attorney is working”).
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breaches of confidentiality when these parties move onto their
137
next job at another firm. To exacerbate the problem, contract
attorneys may not always be supervised directly by associates,
but, rather, by managers hired by the firms to keep costs
138
down. Finally, for some non-associate attorneys the potential
cost of raising a conflict (annoying or embarrassing a superior,
appearing ignorant before a superior, leading to less work and
eventually being let go) could outweigh the benefit of raising a
conflict (protecting the firm from potential ethical issues, satisfaction in upholding professional responsibility standards),
something that works against the client’s interests.
The Model Rules attempt to deal specifically with conflicts
at firms in Rule 1.10, outlining imputations of conflicts of inter139
ests. To a greater or lesser degree, each aspect of this rule has
to do with materiality—how important is the conflict, how
much does it impede representation, and how to limit conflicts
so that the firm may continue representation of a client even if
140
a conflict exist. Unfortunately, all of these rules are only effective with a clear and unbiased reporting of the lawyer’s pre141
vious engagements. As such, they are ineffective at addressing the core issues raised by the current work structure. Law
firms are unable to know, factually, whether or not conflicts exist, because they are unfamiliar with the background of their
142
attorneys and the facts implicated in their cases. In addition,
attorneys have a strong interest in interpreting materiality and
client conflicts in an overly limited fashion to maximize the
number or representations the firm can take on and to ensure
that they themselves will be allowed to be staffed on a given
matter.
b. Conflicts with Lawyers’ Interests
Under the current firm structure, perhaps the largest conflicts arise between a lawyer’s conscious and subconscious personal interests and the interests of the client. The Model Rules
137. Id.
138. See Hayes, supra note 38, at 13.
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2010).
140. See id.
141. See Todd C. Scott, Conflict Checking Systems: Three Great (and
Cheap) Ways to Effectively Manage Conflict Checking, LAW TRENDS & NEWS,
(Feb. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_
news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/conflictchecking.html (indicating that
a conflict “system is only as good as the information that is put into it”).
142. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3.
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recognize that, “[c]oncurrent conflicts of interest can
143
arise . . . from the lawyer’s own interests.” In the current system, every attorney in the law firm, from partner to contract
attorney, is worried on some level about losing his or her job
and remaining valuable to the firm. This makes for a powerful
interest. For firm lawyers, a job is contingent on many things—
not being conflicted out of a matter is the threshold issue to
overcome, with billing enough hours being the long-term issue.
A lawyer might, for instance, ignore or minimize a potential
conflict of interest in order to avoid being conflicted out of a potentially lucrative case. Thus, livelihood is often in tension with
loyalty to the client.
Contract attorneys, more than perhaps anyone else in this
group, are constantly under pressure to find a way to work and
stay employed. Because contract attorneys are constantly moving between firms and through cases, firms rely on contract attorneys to accurately list and assess “reasonably” the matters
144
they have worked on. The inherently transient nature of contract attorney work, where attorneys are involved only superficially in matters, could lead contract attorneys to “reasonably”
assess in their favor that no true conflict exists between them
145
and a party on a matter they would like to work on. However,
their own financial interests are in tension with broader disclosure. Because there is no centralized record of attorney activity,
firms and agencies are entirely dependent on individual attorneys to be forthcoming.

143. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 1.
144. See Fischer, supra note 131, at 211.
145. Model Rule 1.7( b) states that:
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer
reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent
and diligent representation to each affected client; . . . and (4) each affected client gives informed consent confirmed in writing.
Id. R. 1.7( b). Some might argue that clients are fully aware of the conditions
under which lawyers at law firms work and the limitations entailed in that
work since they receive detailed billing statements and sign a retainer including the billing policy as part of their engagement papers. I would argue in opposition to this that even if such writing constitutes consent that consent is
uninformed or based on misinformation. Clients do not understand how contract attorneys are screened in terms of potential conflicts, qualification, or
how the firm approaches the partnership track.
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6. Confidentiality
The institutional norms of private-sector practice have a
greater troubling impact on maintaining client confidentiality.
Model Rule 1.6 governs confidentiality between a client and his
146
or her attorney. It provides that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal
147
information relating to the representation of a client.” However, pressure to bill and respond instantly to clients as well as
regular institutional turnover undermines this obligation.
Billing and norms of hyper-responsiveness undermine confidentiality because they encourage, and even compel, lawyers
148
to work and render advice in public places. In an attempt to
maximize hours, lawyers may read, review, and respond to var149
ious client matters during their commutes or travel time.
Blackberries and cell phones allow lawyers to respond to client
matters outside of a confidential office setting, while norms in
the practice provide the expectation that a lawyer will respond
150
to their clients’ questions or calls instantaneously. Therefore,
lawyers are expected to discuss client matters while at the
lunch counter, walking down the street, in buses or train stations and any number of other public places where there can be
no reasonable expectation of privacy.
The current structure of firms, through partnership norms
and the increased use of temporary labor, also undermines client confidentiality by creating an increasingly transient legal
workforce. Every time a lawyer leaves a firm to go to another
job, there is, inherently, an increased risk to client confidential151
ity. People have knowledge, conscious and unconscious, regarding the affairs of the client, adverse parties, and often, given the nature of electronic discovery, the personal lives of
people working for or with the client. Despite confidentiality
concerns, firms remain structurally predisposed to encourage
matriculation and a norm of lawyer fungibility.

146. Id. R. 1.6.
147. Id. R. 1.6(a).
148. See Law Firms Discovering ‘New Found Time’ with TimeKM Mobile
for BlackBerry, BLACKBERRY.COM, http://www.blackberry.com/newsletters/
connection/business_solutions/i3-2007/defense-lawyer-qa.shtml?CPID=NLC-41
( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
149. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Hot Buttons, 32 L. PRAC. 26,
26 (2006).
150. See id.
151. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.7( b) (discussing a lawyer’s
obligation to a client associated with the lawyer’s former firm).
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First, as a general rule, law firms currently take on far
more first-year associates than they could ever sustain as part152
ners. Historically, firms relied on associate matriculation to
thin the ranks of the upcoming classes. In good economic times,
this would happen organically; associates find other gainful
employment that fits their needs—often the need is to have
better hours, more interesting work, and other quality-of-life
153
benefits. In lean times, this matriculation happens by force,
through lawyers being unofficially “encouraged to look elsewhere,” mass layoffs, and outright firings through exaggerated
154
negative performance reviews. Associates, who have no right
to a severance package or notice, and rarely even have a contract with the firm, have little or no bargaining leverage to oppose the terms of their dismissal. Even if matriculation happens organically, remaining associates do not necessarily stand
a strong chance of making partner; firms increasingly draw
partners from lateral sources—from other sectors or other
155
firms, rather than elevating associates internally. Finally,
some have noted that lawyers uncomfortable with these ethical
tensions may feel compelled to leave the firm rather than at156
tempt to change it.
Second, firms’ increased dependence on temporary legal
staff means lawyers are regularly cycling in and out of the law
firm. Each cycle undermines confidentiality. These attorneys
152. Janet Ellen Raasch, Making Partner or Not: Is It in, up or over in the
21st Century?, 33 LAW PRAC. 32, 35 (2007) (“In a firm with three associates for
each partner—which is considered the ‘sweet spot’—two of every three associates (regardless of their talent) will not make partner. Many highly profitable
firms have four or five associates per partner; some consultants are predicting
eventual levels of 10 to 1.”).
153. Martha Neil, Why Associates Leave Is Clear, but What Would Lure
Them to Stay?, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 21, 2008), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/why_associates_leave_is_clear_but_what_would_lure_them_to_stay/.
154. See Sara Randazzo, For This Year’s New Partners, Perseverance Pays,
AMERICANLAWYER.COM (Jan. 17, 2012), www.law.com (search “New Partners
Perseverance” in Quest box, then follow hyperlink for article title). In this context, lawyers have no rights; they are at-will employees entitled to two weeks’
notice. Severance packages at big law firms have been generous at times but
paltry at others. See Latham Offers Huge Severance Package, JD J. (Mar. 2,
2009), http://www.jdjournal.com/2009/03/02/latham-offers-huge-severance-package/.
155. Cf. Randazzo, supra note 154 (indicating that anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the class of 2011 partners did not take the traditional path
to partnership by practicing at the same firm they joined from law school).
156. See, e.g., Fortney, supra note 4, at 178 (arguing based on survey data
collected from law firm associates and partners, that the billing pressures in
law firms encourages “the exodus of ethical associates who leave private law
practice rather than rationalizing questionable billing practices”).
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157

are engaged for short periods of time on a case-by-case basis.
Such lawyers may be contract attorneys that are brought into
the firm, with general access to firm facilities and other files, or
off-site attorneys hired through domestic or international out158
sourcing. The nature of discovery is very fact intensive. These
lawyers, who are usually hired to do discovery, have access to
voluminous facts. As such, every time temporary attorneys
move on to new firms, they carry with them a wealth of information specific to certain companies and people that could slip
out in subsequent jobs and become unprivileged. When the rotation of attorneys in and out of various firms is so frequent
that it cannot be monitored and disciplined effectively by the
bar, turnover becomes a confidentiality problem for the profession as a whole.
One might argue that the use of internal screens within
159
law firms can combat some of these confidentiality issues.
157. See, e.g., Temporary Attorney: Employers, JURISTAFF.COM, http://www
.juristaff.com/temporary-services-attorney-employers/ ( last visited Apr. 16,
2012).
158. The ethical implications of exporting legal work abroad is an issue deserving of the considerable attention it has received elsewhere. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008) (reviewing a
lawyer’s obligations when outsourcing legal and nonlegal services); Joshua A.
Bachrach, Offshore Legal Outsourcing and Risk Management: Proposing Prospective Limitation of Liability Agreements Under Model Rule 1.8(h), 21 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 631–33 (2008); Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening
the World of Legal Services? The Ethical and Liability Minefields of Offshoring
Legal and Law Related Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 401, 401 (2007); James I.
Ham, Ethical Considerations Relating to Outsourcing of Legal Services by Law
Firms to Foreign Service Providers: Perspectives from the United States, 27
PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 323, 323 (2008); Alison M. Kadzik, The Current Trend
to Outsource Legal Work Abroad and the Ethical Issues Related to Such Practices, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 731, 731 (2006); Michael G. Owen, Legal Outsourcing to India: The Demise of New Lawyers and Junior Associates, 21 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 175, 180 (2008); Mark L. Tuft, Supervising Offshore Outsourcing of Legal Services in a Global Environment: Reexamining Current Ethical Standards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 825, 826 (2010);
Keith Woffinden, Surfing the Next Wave of Outsourcing: The Ethics of Sending
Domestic Legal Work to Foreign Countries Under New York City Opinion
2006–3, 2007 BYU L. REV. 483, 495–502. This Article will not address these
ethical implications of international practice issues in detail at this time.
However, since such practices are profit driven, if attorney unionization were
to take place and require minimum pay for such attorneys commensurate with
domestic pay, the instances of offshore contract lawyering would most likely
decrease.
159. Screening is defined as “the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm
that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information
that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.”
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Model Rule 1.9 allows a lawyer to be screened with the consent
160
of the relevant client(s), while recent revisions to Model Rule
1.10 allow attorneys, in some cases, to be screened with notice,
161
rather than formal former client consent. However, screening
precautions are only effective insofar as they are based on accurate knowledge of the attorneys’ prior representations and an
accurate sense of the adversarial scope of the current client’s
162
case. Therefore, screening itself is subject to the same pragmatic limitations as any confidentiality or conflicts rules in so
far as it relies entirely on self reporting and transparency.
7. Financial Integrity
163

Model Rule 1.5 governs financial integrity. It requires
that “[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or
collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for ex164
penses.” A lawyer’s duty to act with financial integrity toward
his or her client is often viewed as an issue of honesty and can165
dor. In the law firm setting, however, it is married with, and
166
mired in, far more quotidian concerns of billing structures.
Fees in the modern law firm are predominately dictated by
167
time spent on a given matter. However, Model Rule 1.5 lists

MODEL RULES OR PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(k) (2010). Courts also refer to a
“screen” as a “cone of silence,” a “Chinese Wall,” a “firewall,” or a “wall.” Susan
R. Martyn, Screens: The Brave New World?, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar
.org/publications/young_lawyer_home/young_lawyer_archive/screens_the_brave_
new_world.html ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another
person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the
former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.”).
161. Id. R. 1.10(a)(2)(ii). Thirteen jurisdictions allow screening of a lateral
lawyer without former client consent. Martyn, supra note 159.
162. See Andrew J. Drucker, Note, Explanations, Suggestions, and Solutions to Conflict Tracking and Prevention in Response to the Growth and Expansion of the Larger Law Firm, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 529, 549–50 (1999).
163. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5.
164. Id.
165. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Attorney’s Charging Excessive Fee as
Ground for Disciplinary Action—Business and Tax, Employee Benefits and
Termination, Civil Rights, and Other Limited Civil Matters, 27 A.L.R.6th 1, 1
(2007).
166. See Josh Dickinson, Great Expectations (Part 2): The Billable Hour,
Bane of Your Existence, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 20, 2010, 12:11 PM), http://
abovethelaw.com/2010/09/great-expectations-part-2-the-bane-of-your-existence/.
167. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note at 42, at 3.
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eight factors to be considered in assessing the fee structure of a
given representation:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
168
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Note that only factors (1) and (5) directly pertain to hours
169
spent on a given matter. The Model Rules give equal weight
to several other factors related to competency, experience, and
170
outcome. By contrast, the modern law firm emphasizes, almost exclusively, the amount of time spent on a matter as the
171
appropriate measure of a lawyer’s fair wage. In so doing,
firms are overemphasizing time’s role in the billing structure,
at the expense of numerous other meaningful factors. Rather
than modifying their billing structures, however, firms persist
in using the billable hour as an easy-to-administer (though in172
accurate) proxy for the actual value of attorney work.
Unfortunately, law firms are institutionally unable to combat this imbalance. Their customs and conventions—such as
prioritizing billing as the primary measure of value; normalizing routine overwork; sleep deprivation; and extreme workforce
matriculation; and imposing rigid work-flow hierarchies—
prevent implementation of a more nuanced value structure for
173
attorney work. Indeed, a fee structure that would balance all
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a).
169. Id. For a discussion on the practical application of this rule, see
Turow, supra note 45, at 35 (“[D]espite the fact that our profession’s guiding
ethical rule [regarding fees] encourages lawyers to look to other factors, dollars
times hours remains the near universal standard of commercial litigation.”).
170. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a).
171. A.B.A. COMM’N ON BILLABLE HOURS, supra note at 42, at 3.
172. Id.
173. See Ashby Jones, On Working Mothers at Big Firms: A Blistering Critique, WSJ L. BLOG (Feb. 16, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/
16/on-working-mothers-at-big-firms-a-blistering-critique/ (noting the rigorous
working conditions of a large law firm associate).
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of the factors listed in Model Rule 1.5 would require a more detailed and ongoing relationship between firms and employee
lawyers, one in which law firms would know their attorneys’
respective skill levels and expertise as well as the quality of
their attorneys’ work.
The current private-sector model impedes a lawyer’s ability
to be diligent and skillful. This, in turn, limits opportunities to
174
expedite litigation, which leads to unreasonably high fees. In
essence, the financial integrity of any lawyer working in the
private sector is compromised by the conditions under which he
or she works. Efficiency is compromised in several ways. First,
attorneys are tired, so redundancies must be put in place to
175
catch errors. It is unclear how a lawyer may fairly bill a client
for an hour of that lawyers’ time when that lawyer’s work will
be highly variable depending on whether it is the first hour in
176
the day or sixteenth. Second, the firm’s institutional commitment to specialized and meaningful lawyer training is
177
weak. This undermines the legitimacy of the high hourly rate
that firms charge clients for alleged expertise. Third, employees
178
are strongly motivated to inflate hours. Because the reputation of a law firm is tied, at least in part, to profits per partner,
pressure to bill is high for all attorneys.
Beyond this subconscious gaming of the system, poor working conditions also necessitate increased working hours for a
number of reasons. First, mistakes are costly. They require
hours of review to catch and hours of duplicate work. Second,
because people have too much on their plate to coordinate or
are unable or unwilling to concentrate further, lapses in plan174. See supra Part II.A.1–4.
175. See Eve Tahmincioglu, Health Aides, Lawyers Are Most Sleep Deprived, MSN, http://lifeinc.today.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/27/10518575health-aides-lawyers-are-most-sleep-deprived ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
176. See, e.g., Michelle Conlin, Smashing the Clock, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 11, 2006), www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_
50/b4013001.htm (noting an increase in productivity when work hour requirements are relaxed).
177. But cf. David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
11/20/business/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html?pagewanted=
1&sq&st=nyt&scp=1 (“[A]t Drinker Biddle, first-year associates spend four
months getting a primer on corporate law. During this time, they work at a
reduced salary and they are neither expected nor allowed to bill a client. It’s
good marketing for the firm and a novel experience for the trainees.”).
178. See James P. Schratz, I Told You to Fire Nicholas Farber—A Psychological and Sociological Analysis of Why Attorneys Overbill, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 2211, 2216 (1998).
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ning occur that require scrambling at the last minute to get
179
work done before a deadline. Finally, in an attempt to impress clients or partners, attorneys set unreasonable and arbi180
trary deadlines for the completion of work. These unnecessary fire drills run up costs to clients as they require round-theclock work and significant additional redundancies.
Ultimately though, the billing structure itself creates a
conflict when billable hours must be maximized for a lawyer to
protect his livelihood. In other words, a lawyer may have a financial interest in billing more time even though the client will
not benefit from the extra lawyering. Contract attorneys, staff
attorneys, associates, and partners alike all need to bill hours
to build clout, job security, and increase their mobility within
181
the industry. Thus, work becomes a race to the bottom, rewarding those who work all hours of the night and file all possible paperwork, over those who manage cases more leanly.
Law firms are institutionally embedded in a greater legal
culture where they fear that if they push back on clients or
provide service less hastily, the client will simply go to another
182
firm willing to treat its lawyers worse. Moreover, the Model
Rules themselves perpetuate this time-based culture by incor183
porating, and therefore validating, unreasonable norms. This
environment undermines a lawyer’s ability to serve clients
ethically.
8. Professionalism and Duty to the Profession
Finally, the current private-sector system of working and
interacting with clients severely undermines the dignity of the
profession as a whole. The preamble to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility argues that “[t]he continued existence of a
free and democratic society depends upon recognition of the
concept that justice is based upon the rule of law grounded in
respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity
184
through reason for enlightened self-government.” The legal
179. See Amiram Elwork, A Lawyer’s Guide to Dealing with Burnout, 24
PA. LAW. 24, 25 (2002).
180. See id.
181. See id. at 26.
182. See generally Law Firms, A Less Gilded Future, ECONOMIST, May 5,
2011, at 74 (noting the impact of the economic downturn on law firms).
183. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3) (2010) (using “the
fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services” as a measure
of the validity of a given fee structure).
184. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980) (citation omitted).
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profession is charged with upholding this dignity. However, it
is difficult to see how the profession can protect human dignity
for others when it fails to safeguard the dignity of its own
colleagues.
The public view of lawyers has been in a steady and
185
marked decline over the last thirty years. Indeed, much of the
public views lawyers as greedy, uncaring, manipulative, and
186
corrupt. It is understandable that the public has lost respect
for law as a profession when lawyers allow themselves and
their fellow lawyers to be treated without dignity, and as expendable parts in the law firm machinery. Because of the
strong influence firms and firm lawyers have over the bar, and
their prominence in the public eye, the institutional failures of
law firms are magnified. Hierarchies of attorneys within firms,
inequitable distributions of firm wealth, unclear expectations,
variable and unclear benefits, a lack of agency or knowledge,
job insecurity, and general overwork all render a firm attorney
subhuman. If we are to hope or expect the profession to be rehabilitated in the public eye, then it must begin with the dignified and just treatment of lawyers.
185. See generally LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF
LAWYERS: CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS 8, 18 (2002), available at
http://www.cliffordlaw.com/abaillinoisstatedelegate/publicperceptions1.pdf
(“Consumers tell stories of lawyers who misrepresent their qualifications,
overpromise, are not upfront about their fees, charge too much for their services, take too long to resolve matters, and fail to return client phone calls.”);
Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 808–10 (1998) (discussing statistical data regarding public attitudes about lawyers and the lack
of public trust in lawyers); Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi the Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79 A.B.A. J. 60, 60–62 (1993) (reporting, among
other things, that only twenty-two percent of the public believed lawyers are
honest and ethical); Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked, NAT’L. L.J., Aug. 25,
1997, at A6 (noting that the public’s view of the profession of law as one of
“very great prestige” dropped by nearly half from 1977 to 1997).
186. In a 2004 Gallup Poll asking the public to rate twenty-one professions
based on honesty and ethical standards, lawyers ranked 19th, ahead of only
“advertising practitioners” and “car salesmen.” David W. Moore, Nurses Top
List in Honesty and Ethics Poll, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE (Dec. 7, 2004),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14236/nurses-top-list-honesty-ethics-poll.aspx?version=
print; see also LEO J. SHAPIRO & ASSOCS., supra note 185, at 4, 8 (noting that
consumers generally describe lawyers as “greedy, manipulative and corrupt”
with sixty-nine percent of respondents agreeing with the statement that “lawyers are more interested in making money than in serving their clients”);
Symposium, Improving the Professionalism of Lawyers: Can Commissions,
Committees, and Centers Make a Difference?, 52 S.C. L. REV. 443, 490 (2001)
(noting that the public thinks lawyers are “greedy . . . dishonest, deceitful, manipulative, and uncaring” and citing a 1993 survey by Peter Hart for the ABA).
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III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Surprisingly, little of the academic literature focuses on potential solutions to ethical problems caused by the labor norms
of attorneys in the private legal sector. This Part will explore
several of the possibilities for how to deal with these issues.
A. BANISH THE BILLABLE HOUR
While many have argued that the billable hour system
187
there is little likelihood that this
ought to be abolished,
movement will prevail. The billable hour is pervasive across
188
both the private and public sector. While strong arguments
have been made in favor of replacing the billable hour with a
189
“fixed fee structure,” a broad movement towards fixed fees
has not materialized. Proponents of this change argue that clients are ultimately interested in value and outcomes over the
amount of time it takes to reach those outcomes and that law
190
firms would benefit from the administrative costs saved.
While there is some evidence that these views are gaining more
traction in the context of client demands for alternative billing
191
structures, there is still no wide-scale shift away from the
billable hour on the horizon.

187. See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed
to Dishonesty: Lawyers, Money and Professional Integrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
879, 916 (2002) (arguing the practice of imposing billable-hour requirements
should be abandoned); Turow, supra note 45, at 35.
188. While public-sector attorneys do not often have billable hour requirements, many do bill their time to the municipality or state by the hour and are
compensated based on their timekeeping. See, e.g., CJA Panel Attorney Information, U.S. DIST. COURT, N.Y.W. DIST., http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/
document/CJAPANEL.pdf ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (noting hourly compensation structure for attorneys appearing through the federal Criminal Justice
Act); Contra Costa County Court’s Appellate Panel, CONTRA COSTA CNTY. B.
ASS’N, http://www.cccba.org/attorney/build-your-practice/paying-appellate-panel
.php ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (noting that attorneys who appear representing indigent clients on behalf of the state are compensated at a rate of $65 per
hour for out-of-court work, and $120 for court appearances); Fee Schedule For
Criminal Cases, ALAMEDA CNTY. B. ASS’N (July 1, 2010), https://www.acbanet
.org/UserFiles/files/PDFs/LinksLibrary/CAAPFeeSchedulePostedSept2010.pdf
(noting hourly rates and reporting requirements for attorneys representing
indigent clients through the Criminal Court Appointed Attorneys Program).
189. J. Benjamin Stevens, Make Time Work for You: Handling Cases on a
Fixed-Fee Basis, LAW PRACTICE TODAY, A.B.A. (July 2010), http://apps
.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr07103.shtml.
190. Id.
191. Glater, supra note 51.
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Moreover, it is not clear that a move away from the billable
hour, without corresponding cultural and labor changes in law
firm practice, would address the ethical issues endemic in current institutions. On the contrary, some have argued that flat
192
fees lead to minimal representation and encourage laziness.
In addition, the rules of ethics regarding fees clearly state that
193
consideration of time as a factor in fees is warranted. As
such, the key to a functional billing system is to treat time
spent on a matter as one balanced element in the equation of
ethical lawyer fees, rather than as the dispositive force.
B. RELY ON FIRMS TO POLICE ETHICS
The current system relies on internal safeguards in the
firm and lawyer discipline through the bar to enforce ethical
norms. For reasons detailed in Part II, a firm’s internal
measures are usually not effective in policing the systemic issues that undermine the firm’s ability to create an ethical work
194
environment as a whole. Specifically, lawyers are strongly
motivated to downplay ethical issues and conflicts in order to
195
maintain their status and job stability. Furthermore, lawyers
often do not have the information or agency necessary to make
strong advisory decisions for clients and lack perspective on the
196
reasonable limits of their capabilities. In short, because of a
culture of questionable professional norms, law firms are not
objective or effective arbiters of their own actions.
C. DISCIPLINING LAWYERS THROUGH THE BAR
Hypothetically, the bar could regulate and enforce ethics
violations regarding individuals at law firms. However, this is
impracticable for several reasons. First, the rules of ethics are

192. Mark Bennett, Flat Fee Fight: What’s Really Going On?, DEFENDING
PEOPLE (Feb. 15, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://blog.bennettandbennett.com/2011/01/
flat-fee-fight-whats-really-going-on.html (reporting on Texas state bar finding
that flat fees for public defense work were ethically dubious); Meredith Hobbs,
Some Lawyers Say Flat Fees Pose Ethics Issues, LAW.COM (Jan. 10, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/article.jsp?id=1202477784052&Some_Lawyers_Sa
y_Flat_Fees_Pose_Ethics_Issues (stating that this would lead to ethics
concerns).
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010) ( listing eight factors
to consider in fees).
194. See supra Part II.
195. See Elwork, supra note 179.
196. See id. at 25–26 (“[Lawyers] tend to be . . . obsessed with control but
unconvinced that they have it.”).
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ineffective at curtailing many institutional issues in law firms
because they provide neither a break with harmful institution197
198
al cultures, nor sufficiently clear standards. Indeed, one
might argue that these rules can facilitate harmful institutional norms. For example, the factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee do not include the working
conditions of the lawyers or whether it is possible to do the
199
work more efficiently. Rather, the factors look principally at
200
norms in a given locale for similar legal services. Such a focus
is ineffective in curtailing costs associated with institutional
flaws in labor (or other structures) since other firms almost all
201
embrace the same set of flawed institutional components.
Furthermore, in their application to law firms, the Model
Rules are also peppered with amorphous terms that de facto
assimilate and normalize prevailing firm culture. Such terms
are ultimately both ambiguous and overly pliable. The term
202
“reasonable” is pervasive. While the Model Rules clearly state
that associates, staff attorneys and contract attorneys are sub203
ject to ethical discipline for their actions, they are excused
from accountability if they act “in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of
204
professional duty.” Similarly, partners and supervisors are
excused from accountability for ethical violations so long as
they made “reasonable efforts” either “to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Con205
duct.” Discipline for failing to supervise is only allowed in
limited contexts where the supervisor meets a multi-pronged
197. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3).
198. See, e.g., id. R. 5.1.
199. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 276 (2006) (noting that rules invoking
the reasonableness of fees have no limiting principals on their face).
200. Model Rule 1.5(a)(3) allows for the consideration of “the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L
CONDUCT R. 1.5(a)(3) (2010).
201. See Turow, supra note 45, at 36 (noting that the billable hour standard has proliferated so much that there are now firms that specialize in disputing other firms’ hourly billing).
202. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 199, at 277.
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a) (“A lawyer is bound by
the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at
the direction of another person.”).
204. Id. R. 5.2( b) (emphasis added).
205. Id. R. 5.1(a) (emphasis added).
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206

test, again contingent on what is “reasonable.” It is not clear
if this lack of clarity in the firm context is deliberate. Regardless, it is enabling and provides cover against malpractice allegations to law firms stretching ethical bounds.
Second, even if the rules themselves were clearer, the bar
207
has shown reluctance in disciplining lawyers at larger firms.
Some argue this is due to institutional biases in the type of
complaints bar agencies choose to investigate or the severity of
208
the sanctions they impose. Firm lawyers may also receive less
formal public sanctions due to their ability to pay monetary
fines and restitution. The bar associations of over twenty states
provide “diversion” programs rather than formal disciplinary
209
action to deal with lesser ethical violations. Participation in a
diversion program is usually contingent on paying for this pro210
gram. Large firms and lawyers from large firms may also
have more funds available to avoid or lessen disciplinary action
211
through the prompt payment of restitution.
212
Third, discipline through the bar is relatively rare. This
213
may be because the bar has limited resources. Generally

206. Id. R. 5.1(c) (“A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with
knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in
which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the
other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.”).
207. See Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 4 n.30 (2007) (noting that the bar historically has
disciplined lawyers at large law firms at much lower rates than their small
firm counterparts and that large firm lawyers are subjected to relatively little
public lawyer discipline).
208. Id. at 4.
209. Id.
210. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.13(d) (2012).
211. See, e.g., In re Edelman, No. SB-02-0095-D, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 131, at
*16 (Ariz. Aug. 7, 2002) (treating restitution as a mitigating factor when imposing discipline); In re Fischer, 89 P.3d 817, 821 (Colo. 2004) (same); In re
Arabia, 19 P.3d 113, 118 (Kan. 2001) (same).
212. See Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems 2004, A.B.A., charts I, II
(2005),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/discipline/04
-full.authcheckdam.pdf (indicating that of the 127,171 complaints received in
2004, only approximately 5,600 resulted in disciplinary action).
213. Bar’s Restructuring Plan Featured in ABA Article, N.H. BAR ASS’N
(Sept. 6, 2002), www.nhbar.org/publications/archives/display-news-issue.asp
?id=708 (noting the bar association’s volunteer, staff, and financial resources
were “stretched too thin”).
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speaking, the bar may have the staffing to investigate and pur214
sue only the most egregious complaints.
Fourth, the bar may be motivated to accommodate workplace norms that it suspects are at odds with the core principles
215
of professional responsibility. This may be due to limited resources or a vested interest in constructing rules that protect
216
its members from malpractice suits. Regardless, the bar’s
ability to be a reliable barrier between the client and unethical
lawyer behavior is compromised.
Finally, even if the bar had strong motivation and more resources at its disposal, it is not clear that it would be aware of
the violations that are occurring. Under the current system, it
is likely that violations are underreported because clients are
not aware of how cases are run or the ethical obligations of
217
lawyers, and because lawyers internally lack motivation and
perspective to come forward. Like law firms, the bar suffers
from a deficit of information that severely limits its ability to
perform its policing function.
D. NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL LAWYERS
AND FIRMS
One solution to the ethical problems associated with the
current private-practice model would be for individual lawyers
to negotiate formal work agreements with their employers, rather than work in conditions that make it very difficult to effec218
Indeed, associate
tively and ethically perform their jobs.
committees in law firms seek to perform this function. However, they are ineffective at combating internal pressures and
norms that go beyond any individual law firm. As an initial
matter, firm committees do not include many of the types of attorneys who work at firms, specifically contract and staff attor214. Levin, supra note 207, at 3 n.28 (discussing how a diversion program
lessens backlog of ethical investigations).
215. See, e.g., Hirshon, supra note 10.
216. N.H. BAR ASS’N, supra note 213 (noting the bar association’s volunteer, staff, and financial resources were “stretched too thin”).
217. See Report Card: Summary of Findings, HELP ABOLISH LEGAL TYRANNY, http://www.halt.org/reform_projects/lawyer_accountability/report_card/
summary_of_findings.php ( last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (on file with Minnesota
Law Review) (“Of that small subset of misconduct that does constitute a rule
violation, Stanford Law Professor Deborah Rhode notes that the majority of it
goes unreported. Clients frequently lack sufficient information or incentives to
file grievances and many individuals have little understanding of their rights
in disputes with lawyers.”).
218. See supra Part II.A.2.
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neys. Secondly, these committees can only make suggestions to
firms that are non-binding and ultimately place the party pro219
posing change in a vulnerable position. As such, they function
as a very rough means for the firm to gauge and defuse associate discontent before it rises to a point where drastic measures,
such as unionization or going to the press, are considered. The
issues truly plaguing associates—overall hours requirements,
training, responsibility, and the hours worked in a given day—
220
are only collaterally discussed. Instead, these committees are
often limited to covering a narrow range of ancillary (though
very nice) perks—like a lounge area, tech allowances, and in221
clusion of gym memberships.
In good economic times, when both attorneys and the firms
have leverage, this type of a system can work as a temporary
fix. But, without a union, all the perks and privileges negotiated by these committees are: (1) confined to associates and not
all lawyers; (2) not rights but benevolent grants of benefits that
are not guaranteed for any set period of time; and (3) limited to
the bounds of a single law firm, leaving intact industry-wide
pressures to offer clients labor-hostile services (such as twentyfour-hour responsiveness).
Times of economic pressure clarify the inherent power dynamic of the law firm institution. Indeed, all attorneys at the
firm, with the exception of equity partners, are at-will employ222
ees. Because they can be terminated at any time, there is a
strong disincentive for such attorneys to bargain for changes
that the firm, as an institution, might truly resist (such as a
223
cap on the number of work hours in a day). In tight economic
219. Cf. Tiffani N. Darden, The Law Firm Caste System: Constructing a
Bridge Between Workplace Equity Theory & the Institutional Analyses of Bias
in Corporate Law Firms, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 85, 97–98 (2009)
(noting one associate’s experience with associate committees in the context of
diversity initiatives, because “issues go unaddressed” and there is a desire not
to “make waves”).
220. See, e.g., Jill Schachner Chanen, You Rang, Sir?, 86 A.B.A. J. 82, 84
(2000) (describing issues raised by one associates committee as “adding juices
to its array of free beverages to loosening the vacation policies so that lawyers
do not get docked for exceeding their allotted vacation time, given the amount
of hours they work”).
221. On occasion these discussions turn to more substantive topics such as
mentoring, leave policies, or diversity initiatives; however, associate input in
these contexts is advisory and often concessions gained are symbolic or only
occur in response to client or other market forces. See id.
222. See supra Part I.B.2.
223. For a discussion of changes that firms may strongly resist for economic purposes, see supra Part I.
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times, the firm would just refuse the request and the only recourse for the attorneys would be to quit, since pressing the
matter would be to risk their jobs. Simply put, for associates in
particular, the current incentive structure provides no reason
to rock the boat. Attorneys staying at the firm need to make
partner under unclear and often malleable standards that are
inevitably colored by how colleagues and, specifically, superiors
feel about a given attorney. While associates not aiming for
partnership have no long-term commitment to the firm, they
still need recommendations and professional connections moving forward. Thus their personal interests are not aligned with
pursuing institutional change. Law students entering the recruitment process have attempted to encourage labor changes
224
voluntarily, but this has not led to reforms.
E. MAKE AGREEMENTS AMONGST JUNIOR LAWYERS AT FIRMS
Another potential solution would be for firm lawyers, most
likely associates across firms, to meet together and make
agreements about the proper treatment of lawyers in the workplace, hours, pay, other benefits and working conditions. The
attorneys would then approach their respective firms with that
proposal. If the firms disagreed with those terms, then associates at every firm would agree to respond by refusing to work.
If the partners agreed, every firm would inform its clients that
the firms’ rates and the way work would be structured would be
changing and that all firms would be bound by similar labor
225
limitations. Without the collective bargaining structure of a
union, however, federal antitrust laws bar such action.
The Supreme Court dealt with the issue of attorney
agreements and boycotts directly in FTC v. Superior Court Tri226
al Lawyers Association. This case involved a group of trial
lawyers who regularly accepted court appointments in Wash224. In 2007, a group of Stanford law students wrote and circulated a white
paper to law firm hiring partners regarding the negative effects of increasing
billable hour requirements at private law firms and seeking a better quality of
life as related to billable hours. Our Mission, BUILDING A BETTER LEGAL
PROF., http://www.betterlegalprofession.org/mission.php ( last visited Apr. 16,
2012). This paper received significant media buzz. Id. However, it did not
change or alter firm practices. See supra Part I.B.3.
225. Since the reputation of a firm and the expertise they could claim
would not necessarily be equal, this would not mean rate packages would necessarily be the same. What it would mean, however, is that no firm would be
able to work their staff beyond a given number of hours in a day and would
have to adjust the management of cases and the intake of cases accordingly.
226. 493 U.S. 411, 412 (1990).
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ington, D.C., to provide criminal defense services to indigent
227
clients. The attorneys felt they were underpaid and agreed
through their professional association to refuse to take on additional criminal defense cases until the legislature increased
228
their hourly pay. When the District of Columbia failed to pass
legislation increasing the attorneys’ fees, the lawyers refused to
229
take new cases. The system was paralyzed and within two
230
weeks the city council voted for the increase. Then, despite
resolution of the issue, the FTC sued the lawyers with allega231
tions of price fixing and won. Since the attorneys were not
collectively bargaining, their agreement was viewed as an anti232
trust violation. Subsequently, no lawyer agreements of this
kind have been attempted.
F. MAKE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN FIRMS REGARDING LABOR
NORMS FOR LAWYERS
As a threshold matter, discussions between law firms to
agree on the cost and structure of labor would almost undoubt233
edly fail as an antitrust violation. However, even were such
discussions legal, institutional norms of the law firm world
pressure partners away from adopting that course of action.
For a partner to state an interest in creating a labor system
where lawyers work less per day would be to admit an inability
to “play on the level” of other firms that would not agree to
234
such coddling and pampering. In the big law world, there is
enormous pressure to appear tough and invincible; a law firm
lawyer must be able to handle anything, anywhere, under any
conditions. Going to other firms with a set of labor norms that
undermines this modern “I can do anything and give up anything for my client” mentality would equate to saying “I don’t
belong in the big leagues.” Thus, the new institutionalist
framework suggests that partners see certain options, like a
227. Id. at 415.
228. Id. at 415–16.
229. Id. at 416.
230. Id. at 417–18.
231. Id. at 418–21, 436 (vacating the appellate court’s finding that the attorneys’ boycott was protected by the First Amendment based on freedom of
expression).
232. Id. at 428 (“[The attorneys’] concerted action in refusing to accept further [criminal defense] assignments until their fees were increased was thus a
plain violation of the antitrust laws.”).
233. Cf. id. (preventing price fixing between lawyers and legislature).
234. See supra Part I.B (discussing general practices at law firms).
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ten-hour workday, as choices that are unavailable to them.
Because that could mean the loss of business and prestige,
much of what partners have worked and sacrificed for their entire careers, such options are virtually unimaginable.
The irony is that this type of law firm culture obscures the
main function of a lawyer—to advise the client. The advice every law firm should be giving their clients is that a tired, overworked, unhappy lawyer is a dangerous one, a bad one. No one
would dispute that a worker wielding a blowtorch on her seventeenth hour in the day, on the third day in a row of sleeping
fewer than six hours, is a liability—both dangerous and cost236
ly. But working in precisely those kinds of conditions has become relatively commonplace in law firms, and nearly every
lawyer has had something like that experience at some point in
237
his or her career. Law firms often seem blind to the dangers
of having exhausted and depressed lawyers making pivotal de238
cisions for clients. Attorneys should tell clients, “there are
working hours in the day, let’s work during those and I’ll answer the rest of your questions with a clear and sound mind
239
tomorrow.” But sadly, law firms, as institutions, both internally and vis-à-vis each other, do not allow partners to do this.
IV. UNIONIZATION AS THE SOLUTION
Having examined other options, it seems clear that unionization is the most effective way private-sector attorneys can
overcome institutional and legal obstacles and combat the ethical problems inherent in private practice today. Specifically,
unionization overcomes obstacles to institutional change by
eliminating the need for individual actors to become agents for
235. See GORDON, supra note 18, at 17.
236. See UNIV. OF CAL., SAN DIEGO, supra note 107 (declaring the diminished ability to form tasks when deprived of sleep).
237. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text.
238. For many firm lawyers an eight-hour day would be incomprehensible;
therefore this amount of time might be settled at ten hours or even more. In
terms of morale, what some lawyers resent is not purely the length of hours
but the haphazard nature of the hours and resulting inability to plan their day
effectively. See Owen Kelly, Coping with Stress and Avoiding Burnout: Techniques for Lawyers, CANADIAN B. ASS’N, http://www.cba.org/cba/practicelink/
bwl/stresscoping.aspx ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating that “daunting billable hour targets, unpredictable schedules and unreasonable clients—all of
which can seem inescapable, uncontrollable and unremitting” provide stressors for lawyers).
239. Ironically, clients themselves may also appreciate a respite from work
issues being present twenty-four hours a day.
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that change. For the reasons discussed above, law firms, as entities, and law firm partners, in particular, will not take actions
that they view as potentially harmful to their standing with
clients in relation to other firms. Therefore, only limitations
that apply across firms and to clients, regardless of which law
firm they select, will actually change the institutional structure
of firms.
As discussed earlier, two main facilitators of unethical behavior in private practice are systemic: (1) firms have highly
leveraged associate-to-partner ratios, leading to little training,
poor oversight, and a lack of agency and decision making on the
240
part of non-partners; and (2) firms use a billable hour system
241
that pressures all parties to maximize billable hours. Unionization would counter both of these problems. First, in terms of
leverage, union contracts would likely change at-will employees
into employees requiring formal termination proceedings, severance packages, and other job loss compensation. This would
encourage firms to hire people they plan to retain, lowering the
partner-to-junior lawyer ratio and encouraging investment in
training and retention. Turnover would likely be lower. These
changes would create a work environment that better fosters
diligence, competence (both technical and advisory), loyalty,
and confidentiality.
In relation to billable hours, a union that includes associates from all or most law firms could demand reforms of billable structures to make them more reasonable, attainable, and
amenable to ethical legal work. Specifically, a private-attorney
union could demand different minimum billable targets; set
overall billable maximums; include firm activities, professional
development, and training as part of billable hours; set maximum working hours and regular break times and durations;
and negotiate for additional breaks or other time off for occasional overtime scenarios. Currently, no formal limits on the
billable hour are in place beyond the number of hours in a
242
day. However, with limitations on the manner in which time
could be billed, the systemic incentives to inflate time could be
eliminated and replaced by an emphasis on efficiency, the qual240. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law Firm Leverage
Drops to Levels Last Seen 10 Years Ago (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://
www.nalp.org/lawfirmleveragedrops (stating leverage ratios by firm size and
office location).
241. See Turow, supra note 45, at 34 –36.
242. See Holmen, supra note 74.
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ity of work, and strategic decision making. Unionization is the
only way for attorneys from different firms or companies to
meaningfully negotiate for the binding contracts that would
give them the leverage with firms and clients to change how
the billable hour is used. Only by controlling labor conditions
and the maximum billable hours in a given day, week, or
month can lawyers reclaim their professionalism, sense of selfworth, and capacity to render good judgments.
A. THERE ARE NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ATTORNEY
UNIONIZATION
Since relatively few attorneys have unionized, one might
wonder if it is illegal for attorneys to do so. This Section outlines how private-sector lawyers can lawfully unionize and why
doing so would be to their advantage. Forming a union provides
unparalleled legal protection and leverage for the workers
involved.
1. Lawyers Can Unionize Legally
The legal process of unionization can accommodate law243
yers. The core of federal labor law is the National Labor Rela244
tions Act (NLRA), passed in 1935. The NLRA granted “employees” the rights to self-organize; to form, join, and assist
labor organizations; and to bargain collectively through repre245
It also created the National Labor Relations
sentatives.
Board (NLRB) to administer and adjudicate employment mat246
ters. To form a union, a group must be certified by a local
247
248
NLRB office as a valid “bargaining unit” under the NLRA.
Later, Congress amended the NLRA to explicitly cover “profes249
sional employees.”
243. There are many other professional unions, for example, the Office and
Professional Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, the Marine Engineers’
Beneficial Association, and the Union of American Physicians and Dentists.
244. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006); see also
FRED WITNEY & BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 13 (7th ed.
1996) (confirming that the year of passage was 1935).
245. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (stating the federal statutes applicable to labor relations).
246. See id. § 153(a) (establishing the NLRB as the agency to administer
the NLRA).
247. See id. § 153( b) (authorizing delegation of power to regional offices
and directors).
248. Id. § 159( b).
249. See id. § 152(12)(a) (defining a professional as “any employee engaged
in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to
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Moreover, as a matter of general law and as confirmed by
the NLRB, lawyers in law firms and private corporations have
250
the same rights as any other employees under the NLRA. The
fact that lawyers are officers of the court in no way detracts
251
from their protections under the NLRB. In Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. of Chicago, the NLRB explicitly recognized
252
an attorney’s right to unionize in the private sector. Existing
case law adopts this standard and recognizes the legal right of
the private sector to collective bargaining pursuant to the
253
NLRA. Finally, since 1977, the NLRB has explicitly exercised
254
jurisdiction over law firms that gross $250,000 or more.
Although relatively rare, lawyers are members in unions,
255
and the NLRB has recognized such membership. Currently,
routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a
character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be
standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of
an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a
prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic
education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of
routine mental, manual, or physical processes”); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded Managers from Covered Professionals Under the NLRA, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1775, 1794 (1989).
250. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states that, “A lawyer who hires a lawyer or nonlawyer as an employee is subject to applicable
law governing the employment relationship, such as contract law, antidiscrimination legislation, unjust-discharge law, and labor relations law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56(k) (2000); see also Kennedy,
Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, slip op. at 24 –25 (NLRB June 20,
2003), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2-RC-22718 (follow “View” hyperlink to the right of “RD Decision and Order”) (rejecting law firms’ reasoning
that lawyers should be treated differently than other groups of employees).
251. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. of Chi., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1136–37 (1948).
252. See id. at 1137–39 (“That the attorneys have a statutory right to selforganization cannot be denied.”); see also Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 97
N.L.R.B. 929, 939 (1951) (ruling that nonprofessional and professional airline
employees—including attorneys—may form a bargaining unit), overruled by
Oregon Teamsters’ Sec. Plan Office, 113 N.L.R.B. 987, 991 n.7 (1955).
253. See Chiles v. State Emps. Attorneys Guild, 714 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998), aff ’d, Chiles v. State Emps. Attorneys Guild, 734 So. 2d
1030, 1036 (Fla. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, N. Fla. Women’s Health &
Counseling Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003).
254. David Van Os & Assocs., P.C., 346 N.L.R.B. 804, 808 (2006) (stating
that gross receipts must exceed $250,000); Camden Reg’l Legal Servs., Inc.,
231 N.L.R.B. 224, 224 (1977) (setting income cap at $250,000); Foley, Hoag &
Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. 456, 457 (1977) (establishing jurisdiction over law firms).
255. See, e.g., Wayne Cnty. Neighborhood Legal Servs., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B.
1023, 1024 (1977) (allowing a unit of staff attorneys).
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there are also unionized lawyers who are part of broader unions that include nonlawyers and other members of the same
256
company. Notably, lawyer unionization from the private sector is beginning to gain more traction. In 2003, a group of attorneys from Parker Stanbury LLP, a private Los Angelesbased law firm, joined the Teamsters Union after failed discus257
sions regarding working conditions and pay. To date, no legal
or disciplinary action on the part of the bar against the attorneys has been reported.
2. Arguments Against Certifying Attorney Unions: The Law
Firm’s Case
While lawyers do have a right to unionize as a matter of
law, law firms may challenge their status as employees under
258
the NLRA. Law firms may also contest the formation of unions of lawyers. Specifically, they may argue that unionization
is unavailable to their associates, staff, and contract lawyers
because they act as confidential employees, managerial employees, or supervisors, all of which are exempt from NLRA
259
protections.
For several reasons, such claims would most likely fail.
First, “confidential employees” is a term of art in labor law, denoting employees who have access to the confidential labor information of a company, and therefore would skew the collec-

256. Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, slip op. at 25 –29
(NLRB June 20, 2003), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2-RC-22718 (follow “View”
hyperlink to the right of “RD Decision and Order”) (ordering an election to
choose between a unit of attorneys or of attorneys, secretaries, legal assistants, receptionists, and bookers ordered); Am. Fed’n of State-Cnty.-Mun.
Emps. Council 93, Case No. 1-RC-21569, at 9 (NLRB Dec. 5, 2002), http://www
.nlrb.gov/case/1-RC-21569 (follow “View” hyperlink to the right of “RD Decision and Order”) (ordering a self-determination election to determine if attorneys should be in a separate unit or in a unit including field staff representatives, senior field staff representatives, and organizers); cf. Lumbermen’s Mut.
Cas. Co. of Chi., 75 N.L.R.B. at 1138–39 (approving a separate unit for attorneys employed by an insurance company).
257. Ryan F. Gabrielson, Lawyers Set Precedent, Join Teamsters Union,
ARIZ. BUS. GAZETTE (Mar. 27, 2003, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/
abgnews/articles/0327union27.html?&wired (noting the unionization of the
firm’s Phoenix office).
258. Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, The Right of Attorneys to Unionize,
Collectively Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 299, 303 (2000).
259. Parties asserting such claims bear the burden of proof. See LeMoyneOwen Coll., 345 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1128 (2005).
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260

tive bargaining process. In 2003, the NLRB rejected outright
the claim that lawyers act as confidential employees, and it is
261
unlikely to reverse its position.
Courts are also unlikely to exclude non-partner law firm
lawyers from unionization by classifying them as “managerial
employees.” Although the NLRA does not contain the term
262
“managerial employees,” the Supreme Court defined the term
to include employees who “formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions
263
of their employer.” In implementing this exclusion, the NLRB
and subsequent courts have found that it does not apply to
264
rank-and-file employees with routine duties, but only to ex265
ecutives, whose duties are “outside the scope of duties rou266
tinely performed by a similarly situated professional.” Were it
otherwise, “the managerial exclusion . . . would sweep all professionals outside the Act in derogation of Congress’ expressed
267
intent to protect them.”
The key factor in determining whether an individual is exempted from NLRB protections as a “managerial employee” is
whether the party involved may make discretionary decisions
268
on his or her own regarding company policy. Although the
NLRB has not addressed this issue in relation to private-sector
lawyers, it is longstanding precedent that staff doctors and

260. Mitchell H. Rubenstein, Attorney Labor Unions, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J.,
Jan. 2007, at 23, 23–24.
261. See Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., Case No. 2-RC-22718, at 22 n.12
(rejecting law firms reasoning that lawyers were excluded from unions as “confidential employees”).
262. While the Act is silent on this point, the legislative history of the Act
indicates that such employees were meant to be excluded. ROBERT A. GORMAN
& MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW § 3.7 (2d ed. 2004).
263. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 288 (1974) (quoting Palace
Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)).
264. Evergreen Am. Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.3d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
265. Bell Aerospace Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385–86 (1975).
266. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 690 (1980); Nurses United, 338
N.L.R.B. 837, 840 (2003).
267. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 690.
268. Id. at 683 (stating a key factor in this determination is whether an
employee “represents management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy”);
LeMoyne-Owen Coll., 345 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1128–29 (2005) (holding that faculty
were managerial employees because they effectively make decisions in critical
areas such as curriculum, course content, determination of honors, grading,
admission standards, and participation in tenure decisions).
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dentists are not excludable as managerial employees. This is
relevant because staff doctors and dentists, like the general
non-partner attorney pool at a law firm, are professionals with
professional obligations who have historically had autonomy
over their work and oversight over other semiprofessionals
270
(such as nurses or technical assistants). However, the legal
consideration in determining managerial status is whether an
employee—professional or not—has discretionary authority
over company policy and not just over matters within his or her
limited sphere of influence, even where such influence requires
271
considerable professional training or expertise. A key evidentiary factor that the NLRB considers in a managerial employee
inquiry is whether there are “comprehensive manuals and in272
structions” limiting discretion. Most law firms have practice
manuals delineating procedures for dealing both with intra273
firm matters and with clients or the media. Because associates, staff, and contract attorneys working for firms exercise
limited discretion in routine situations, within the confines of
firm protocols and reviews, the managerial exception will most
likely not apply.
The best argument that law firms have against associate
274
unionization is that associates act as supervisory employees.
269. Third Coast Emergency Physicians, P.A., 330 N.L.R.B. 756, 756 (2000)
(finding that “ultimate decision-making authority . . . is retained by the two
medical directors rather than the physicians”); Montefiore Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
261 N.L.R.B. 569, 571–72 (1982) (refusing to find “that the managerial participation . . . so aligns the staff doctors with management or places them sufficiently within the managerial structure as to warrant their exclusion”). But
see Chief Judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit v. Ill. State Labor Relations
Bd., 687 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. 1997) (holding that government attorneys—
assistant public defenders—were managerial employees and therefore not subject to the collective bargaining provisions of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act).
270. See Montefiore, 261 N.L.R.B. at 572 (holding that while doctors performed some managerial duties, those duties did not “fall outside the professional duties primarily incident to patient care”).
271. Id. at 570 (“As professional employees, the doctors may also be managerial, but their managerial status may not be based on decision making
which is part of the routine discharge of professional duties.”).
272. Bell Aerospace Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 386 (1975).
273. See T. Jackson Bedford Jr., Managing by Manual, 77 A.B.A. J. 103,
103 (1991) (declaring a law firm manual to be “as indispensable as a computer
system for law office management” because a manual “details the day-to-day
policies and procedures to be followed . . . by staff and attorneys” and thereby
“reduces the time spent by lawyers in managing”).
274. Notably, few of these arguments hold water in relation to staff attorneys or contract attorneys who, due to their transient and uncertain employ-
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Originally, the NLRA took an expansive view of the term employee, but Congress revised that view in the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947, divesting supervisory employees of NLRA protec275
tions. Today, supervisors are still specifically excluded from
276
the NLRA’s protections. Ironically, while the NLRA explicitly
defines the term “supervisory employee,” application of the
term has been highly contested. The Supreme Court has stated
that, to be a supervisory employee, a worker must: (1) participate in one of twelve activities specifically enumerated in the
277
278
NLRA; (2) exercise independent judgment; and (3) hold the
279
authority in the interest of the employer. Participation in a
single supervisory activity establishes supervisory status if in280
dependent authority is wielded in the interest of the employer.
In 2006, the NLRB issued a series of three administrative
decisions aimed at clarifying the scope of the supervisory excep281
tion. These cases currently define what it means to assign
ment status, are not placed in supervisory roles, even over nonlegal staff. See
Chief Judge of the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, 687 N.E.2d at 801 (holding that
although public defenders were managerial employees, that classification
should not be interpreted to mean all publicly employed attorneys are deemed
managerial employees, but should be limited to only those attorneys with a
similar amount of discretion and control).
275. See 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2006) (declaring that injunctive relief in employment cases should not be granted unless absolutely necessary); N.L.R.B. v. Ky.
River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 717–18 (2001) (discussing history of the
supervisory exclusion).
276. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
277. The twelve statutory activities are the ability:
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them,
or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action,
if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is
not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. § 152(11).
278. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. 511 U.S. 571, 589 (1994).
279. Id. at 573–74.
280. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. NLRB, 271 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir.
2001) (declaring that “the existence of any one of the listed powers, as long as
it involves the use of independent judgment, is sufficient to support a determination of supervisory status”); Bryant Health Ctr., Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. No.
80, 742 (Jan. 30, 2009) (finding that the twelve statutory acts are meant to be
read disjunctively); Fred Meyer Alaska, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 646, 649 (2001)
(holding that “a person needs to possess only one of the specific criteria
listed”).
281. See Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 717, 717 (2006) (noting that the
Croft Metals, Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., and Golden Crest cases were filed together to determine the “supervisory issues on review”); Golden Crest
Healthcare Ctr., 348 N.L.R.B. 727, 727 (2006) (calling the three companion
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work, direct another employee, and act with independent
282
judgment. Although these cases leave open the question of
whether associates at law firms would be viewed as supervisors
under the law, they are by no means clearly dispositive in the
negative. Rather, recent NLRB decisions show that the supervisory exception will not be interpreted so broadly as to over283
whelm the inclusion of all professionals under NLRA. Since
the party seeking to prove supervisory status bears the burden
284
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, a law firm seeking to prevent its associates from unionizing would have to
show that the associates in question acted as supervisors. Given that analogous employment case law holds that even law
firm partners do not necessarily exercise sufficient control over
285
firm matters to be excluded from employment law protection,
this burden may prove difficult to meet. This is particularly so
where changes to federal pleading standards, requiring more
specific pleadings, are also limiting how many claims go to
286
court.

cases “identical filings” to clarify Section 2(11) of the NLRA); Oakwood
Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 686 (2006) (characterizing the decision as
an attempt to come up with a method for interpreting Section 2(11) of the
NLRA).
282. See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 689–94 (discussing
those three key phrases in depth); see also Golden Crest, 348 N.L.R.B. at 727
(adopting Oakwood’s standards and exploring them in different factual scenarios); Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 718–19 (focusing on assignment and
direction).
283. Bryant Health Ctr., Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. at 742–45 (rejecting claim that
licensed nurse practitioners at a nursing home were supervisors exempt from
protection under the NLRA).
284. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. at 686–87 (stating that the
party asserting a supervisory authority claim bears the burden of proof ); Dean
& Deluca New York, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 1046, 1047 (2003) (stating that the
party asserting a supervisory status must establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence).
285. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir.
2002) (finding that Sidley Austin’s arguments that partners were employers
and not employees were unconvincing given the relative lack of authority the
partners wield on behalf of the firm).
286. Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split
Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109,
120 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/10/27/michalski.html (discussing
the implications of recent changes in federal pleading standards in state
courts for civil rights and employment discrimination cases).
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3. Activity by State Bars
The legitimacy of unionization is confirmed by the fact
that, in the limited cases where lawyers have unionized, they
were not disbanded by the state or local bar. In a 1975 opinion,
the New York County Bar Association’s Committee on Legal
Ethics (NY Committee) considered whether a strike by unionized Legal Aid Lawyers was ethical under the New York Code
287
The NY
of Professional Responsibility (New York Code).
Committee did not question, indeed it assumed, (1) the legal
right of attorneys to form unions and (2) the legal right of those
288
unions to strike. The NY Committee found that in exercising
these legal rights, lawyers maintained an obligation during the
strike not to disrupt the proceedings of the court or deprive
their clients of proper representation and a speedy trial, which
289
in this specific case was found improper. However, subsequent strikes have proceeded without ethical action from the
290
state bar. Moreover, in later decisions, the NY Committee defended and expanded the right of attorneys to join unions by al291
lowing attorneys to join unions that include nonlawyers.
B. THERE ARE NO FORMAL ETHICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO
ATTORNEY UNIONIZATION
One critique of lawyers joining or forming unions is that,
by doing so, they would violate the rules of professional ethics.
Specifically, the concern is that zealous, competent, and diligent representation will be neglected in service of labor goals
292
and union activity. This Section makes clear that: (1) the
287. N.Y. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 645, 1 (1975).
288. Id. at 2.
289. Id. at 4.
290. See Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be
Compelled to Render the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363,
395–96 (1993) (noting that in October 1982, the Legal Aid Society in New York
conducted a successful ten-week strike that ended in a favorable contractual
settlement); see generally NY Legal Aid Lawyers Return, 147 LAB. REL. REP.
221, 221 (1994) (reporting on the New York Legal Aid Society’s 1994 strike).
291. N.Y. State Bar, Op. 578 (Dec. 4, 1986), available at http://www.nysba
.org/AM/PrinterTemplate.cfm?Section=ethics_opinions&ContentID=55423&
template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (upholding the right of an attorney to join
a union even if the union has nonlawyer members, provided that the lawyer
does not represent the State in disciplinary proceedings in certain situations).
292. The argument that unionization is incompatible with professional
values is longstanding, though not as specifically applied to lawyers. Henry
Mintzberg, A Note on the Unionization of Professionals from the Perspective of
Organization Theory, 5 INDUS. RELATIONS L.J. 623, 631–32 (1983).
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rules of ethics allow attorney unionization; (2) existing court
and administrative decisions affirm that there is no conflict between a lawyer’s professional responsibility and unionization;
and (3) a lawyer may be ethically obligated to pursue better
working conditions since they are intimately related to the ability to serve the client.
1. The Rules of Ethics Allow Attorney Unionization
Current interpretations of the Model Code clearly permit
293
This is notable because the ABA
attorney unionization.
Commission on Ethics opposed unionization of attorneys until
294
as recently as 1967. When the Model Code was adopted, the
ABA Commission revisited the issue of attorney membership in
295
unions and took a more expansive and permissive approach.
In Informal Opinion 1325, the Commission stated that Ethical
Consideration 5-13 (EC 5-13) under the ABA Model Code pro296
EC 5-13
vides guidance concerning union membership.
provides:
A lawyer should not maintain membership in or be influenced by any
organization of employees that undertakes to prescribe, direct, or
suggest when or how he should fulfill his professional obligations to a
person or organization that employs him as a lawyer. Although it is
not necessarily improper for a lawyer employed by a corporation or
similar entity to be a member of an organization of employees, he
should be vigilant to safeguard his fidelity as a lawyer to his employ297
er, free from outside influences.

Although the opinion acknowledged potential tension between certain union activity and disciplinary rules, it did not
298
find striking to be categorically unethical. Rather, the Com-

293. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325
(1975) (interpreting ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-13).
294. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 986
(1967) (holding that salaried, employee-lawyers could join a union or organization—comprised entirely of lawyers working for the same employer—to negotiate wages and working conditions, but that they could not strike or withhold
their services); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op.
917 (1966) (stating the fear was that through union membership the lawyer
would be “surrendering his independent judgment” and would become “subject
to the direction of the union and its officers”).
295. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op.
1325 (1975) (“[L]awyers are not forbidden per se to belong to unions . . . . Earlier pre-Code opinions took a somewhat different view.”).
296. See id.
297. MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-13 (1983).
298. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof ’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1325
(1975).
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mission set forth a fact-specific inquiry that pragmatically
299
weighs the strike’s actual impact on client representation.
This inquiry provides a pragmatic framework, allowing state
bars to differ over the ethics of any particular attorney strike
300
depending on the given circumstances.
2. Case Law and Administrative Decisions Support a Lawyer’s
Right to Unionize
Moreover, existing case law rejects the assertion that there
is an ethical bar to lawyers forming unions. Specifically, courts
have held that attorneys suing for wages or other conditions of
301
employment do not violate their duty of loyalty. Santa Clara
County Counsel Attorneys Association v. Woodside is particularly notable for the purpose of considering whether a court would
view union activity as unethical. In Santa Clara, public sector
lawyers sued to enforce their rights to bargain collectively un302
der statutory law. The court in Santa Clara found that such
suits do not categorically undermine a lawyer’s traditional duty
of loyalty or “any other ethical obligation” owed to the lawyer’s
303
employer or client. Rather, the court recognized that “[t]he
growing phenomenon of the lawyer/employee requires a realistic accommodation between an attorney’s professional obliga304
tions and the rights he or she may have as an employee.”
The NLRB has separately concluded that there is no conflict between union membership and a lawyer’s professional duties. Repeatedly, the NLRB has rejected the allegation that un305
ion activity is professionally irresponsible or unethical. In
299. See id. (noting that neglecting a legal matter could require discipline,
but in other cases a strike may be “no more disruptive of the performance of
legal work than taking a two week vacation”).
300. See, e.g., N.Y. Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 645, 1–4
(1975) (finding a strike by a union of legal aid lawyers to be unethical when it
impedes the administration of justice); Mendecino Public Attorneys Strike,
CAL. REP. (Mar. 8, 2007), http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R703080850
(reporting an attorney strike in California where no subsequent bar disciplinary measures were taken).
301. E.g., Santa Clara Cnty. Counsel Attorneys Ass’n v. Woodside, 869
P.2d 1142, 1157–58 (Cal. 1994).
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1157.
304. Id.
305. See Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, slip op. at 20–
25 (N.L.R.B. 2003), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/2-RC-22718 (follow “View” hyperlink to the right of “RD Decision and Order”); Foley Hoag & Eliot, 229
N.L.R.B. 456, 457–58 n.12 (1977); Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. of Chic., 75
N.L.R.B. 1132, 1140 (1948).
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306

examining EC 5-13, the NLRB explicitly considered and rejected the assertion that membership in a union undermines a
lawyer’s ability to act free of outside influence on his or her cli307
ent’s behalf.
3. An Affirmative Ethical Obligation to Strike? Attorney and
Client Interests Are Aligned in Relation to Working Conditions
The creation of a fair workplace with a reasonable workload and transparent work structure is actually aligned with,
rather than opposed to, a lawyer’s ethical obligations to a client. The Model Code requires that “[a] lawyer shall
308
not . . . [n]eglect a legal matter entrusted to [him/her].” It also
states that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . [h]andle a legal matter
which he[/she] knows or should know that he[/she] is not com309
petent to handle . . . .” Indeed, the New York Code makes
clear that lawyers unable to render adequate legal representa310
tion to their clients must withdraw. Like the Model Code,
these rules forbid a lawyer from “handl[ing]“ a legal matter
which the lawyer knows or should know that he or she is not
311
competent to handle,” and from “hand[ling] a legal matter
312
“without preparation adequate in the circumstances.”
Poor working conditions embedded in current firm labor
practices undermine lawyers’ abilities to meet these obligations
because they are too tired, ill-informed, dissatisfied, and disillusioned to behave truly professionally or ethically. Indeed, the
current system breeds inadequate preparation—sloppiness,
loss of judgment and skill due to overwork, and selfaggrandizement prioritized over candor—none of which benefits the client, the court, or the profession.
Under conditions that make ethical representation impossible, some courts have found that it is appropriate, even ethical, to withhold representation. For example, in New Orleans,
public defender Rick Teissier refused to go to trial when there
306. MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-13 (1983).
307. Kennedy, Schwartz & Cure, P.C., No. 2-RC-22718, at 10–25.
308. MODEL CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A).
309. Id.
310. “A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment . . . if . . . [t]he lawyer
knows or it is obvious that continued employment will result in violation of a
Disciplinary Rule.” N.Y. CODE OF PROF ’ L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(B)(2)
(2007).
311. Id. DR 6-101(A)(1).
312. Id. DR 6-101(A)(2).
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was not enough money available to fund a necessary expert
313
witness. Then, after considering briefing on the issue, the
court reversed a finding of contempt and instead ordered a
structural overhaul of the public defender system on grounds
314
that the system was institutionally flawed.
The integrity of the lawyer as an employee and a person is
irrevocably intertwined with broader interests, particularly client interest. It is integrity in both mind and body that fortifies
a lawyer so that he or she can exercise good judgment and be a
loyal, diligent, discreet, and measured advisor. A client hires a
lawyer to be a professional. When lawyers are not treated as
professionals and no longer have the physical capacity to act
315
with clarity, they do not act professionally.
Ultimately, the current firm work structure hampers a
lawyer’s ability to fulfill his or her duties to clients and the
courts and undermines the already poor standing of the legal
profession in the public eye. If lawyers cannot act as professionals and thereby fulfill their duty to their clients, they have
an ethical obligation to take measures to ensure that they can
provide adequate representation and fulfill those duties. As
discussed above, the only means to achieve this goal in the private sector is for firm attorneys to unionize. Therefore, privatesector attorneys have an ethical duty to unionize.
C. ALL IMPEDIMENTS TO UNIONIZATION ARE CULTURAL AND
THEREFORE NONBINDING
The only actual barriers that exist to private attorney unionization are cultural—in both the legal profession and society
at-large. Like most professionals, lawyers have a culture and
316
tradition of not unionizing. Unions are associated with bluecollar positions and, to some extent, economic hardship, rather
317
than workplace mistreatment. At first blush, the idea of unionizing firm attorneys seems laughable. Firm attorneys, particularly associates, often feel ashamed that they are unhappy
or have complaints regarding their jobs because of their high
313. Mark Hansen, P.D. Funding Struck Down, 78 A.B.A. J. 10, 18 (1992).
314. Id.
315. Cf. Schiltz, supra note 5, at 729 (explaining how the professional dissatisfaction can lead to unethical behavior by young attorneys).
316. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION
OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 54 (1995).
317. Cf. id. (describing the characterization of American unions as “lower
class”).
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318

salaries. However, it is well known among attorneys that
firm lawyers tend to be profoundly unhappy, largely due to the
long hours, the insecurity of their job positions, the lack of
ownership in their jobs, and a sense that they went to law
319
school to be a lawyer, not a widget.
Previously, a lack of willpower and willingness to break
320
with convention rendered the likelihood of unionization low.
However, the current economic downturn in the legal market
and the accompanying sense of disenfranchisement that lawyers are experiencing may provide the needed impetus to push
private attorneys to action. Unions in the United States have a
321
long history of being forged in the fires of economic turmoil.
Indeed, it is in the moments when labor is weakest that collective action provides the most meaningful way to negotiate for
322
improved working conditions.
D. HOW UNIONS WILL BALANCE FIRM INSTITUTIONS AND
FOSTER PROFESSIONALISM
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act added a provision to the NLRA
stating that the duty to bargain requires the parties to meet
and “confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and oth323
er terms and conditions of employment.” There are many issues that a firm lawyer union could pursue as a basic contract
platform. Specifically, a union of law firm lawyers could negotiate to set reasonable hours’ targets, a maximum number of
hours that may be worked in a given day, and a total number of
324
hours worked in a given week or thirty-six hour period. A un318. Daniel Lukasik, How Stress and Anxiety Become Depression, LAWYERS
DEPRESSION (May 22, 2011), http://www.lawyerswithdepression.com/
articles/how-stress-and-anxiety-become-depression-2/.
319. See generally Schiltz, supra note 73, at 886 (discussing the high instances of depression, anxiety, divorce, and job dissatisfaction amongst lawyers and noting that for both associates and partners, “[ l]awyers in large law
firms are often among the least happy” (citation omitted) (quotation omitted)).
320. See Eric E. Johnson, Law-Firm Associates Should Unionize,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 28, 2008), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/
02/law-firm-associ.html.
321. Key Events in Labor History, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/About/
Our-History/Key-Events-in-Labor-History ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
322. See, e.g., Labor History Timeline, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/
About/Our-History/Labor-History-Timeline ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
323. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (2006).
324. For a list of some of the potential benefits of lawyer unionization, see
Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Attorney Labor Unions, 79 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 23, 23 (2007).
WITH
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ion could also negotiate for fixed required break times—for example, break times would count as part of hours targets and
would have to be scheduled in regularly, such as a half hour off
325
for every five hours worked.
Related to this, a union could push to set clear policies on
how much travel may be asked of a lawyer in any given twentyfour hour period and what amount of rest is required after326
wards. Other issues to be considered might include salaries
and contracts regarding sick leave and vacation time for nonassociate lawyers, as well as working conditions (e.g., crowding,
lighting, equipment used in the workplace, and workplace327
related injuries) and granting vacation time for work on holi328
days. A union-negotiated contract could seek to explicitly lay
out the circumstances under which an attorney has the right to
refuse a work assignment and when overtime or additional
compensation is required. A clear work contract could also lay
out promotion and termination terms as well as compensation
for termination.
Beyond any one demand, unionization would have a positive effect on morale. First, morale would be improved by workers having a sense of agency and security. It would give lawyers
a sense of protection that would allow them to act definitively
in favor of their clients’ interests. Second, by unifying all firm
lawyer employees—from associates to contract attorneys—in a
common set of rights, unionization would produce better teamwork and work product. Third, unionization would focus the
competitive energy of attorneys on improving the quality of
their work in the long-run, rather than merely attempting to
survive from one case to the next. As such, time invested in acquiring skills, developing specialized expertise, becoming
measured advisors, participating in bar activities, and producing quality work would be viewed as essential, allowing attorneys to reconnect with a broader sense of professionalism.

325. See id.
326. See id.
327. Work-related injuries do occur in office settings but they are often the
slow and gradual injuries of repetitive motions or poor working positions. Beyond typical slip and fall incidents or being injured while transporting evidence
or documents, carpal tunnel, eye damage, and back issues are commonplace.
WASH. INDUS. SAFETY & HEALTH ACT SERVS. DIV., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF LABOR & INDUS., OFFICE ERGONOMICS: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR A SAFER WORKPLACE 3–4 (2002), available at http://www.lni.wa.gov/IPUB/417-133-000.pdf.
328. See id.
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Unionization may also alleviate some of the confidentiality
issues created by the increased use of contract attorneys. Specifically, if contract attorneys themselves were unionized, firms
would be able to bargain for the creation of a database of matters that each attorney had worked on, a running conflicts list
of sorts, for each union member. Unionization may also lead to
the diminished use of contract attorneys. If unionized, contract
attorneys would likely demand benefits, better work environments, and clearer contract terms. This would eliminate some
of the motivations firms now have to hire contract attorneys in
the first place: contract attorneys are attractive to firms in a
large part because they are entirely fungible, the ultimate at329
will employees. With increased bargaining power, particularly in a union aligned with associates, this balance will change,
encouraging law firms to think long and hard about the role of
contract attorneys in the firm structure.
E. NO PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVE: WHY NOW?
Since the financial sector crash of 2008, the balance of
power between associates and law firms, and law firms and
330
their clients, has shifted indelibly. Associates fear losing their
331
jobs. New graduates and other laid-off attorneys flood the
332
market with cheap contract or temporary labor. Partners feel
additional pressure to bring in business (especially in firms
333
334
that are not lockstep) and keep profits up. Some firms in
329. Kathryn M. Fenton, Use of Temporary or Contract Attorneys, 13 ANTI23, 26 (1998) (characterizing the contract attorney-firm relationship as
“inherently limited in nature”).
330. Law Shucks, a blog dedicated to large law firms, reports that between
January 1, 2008, and December 11, 2011, over 15,435 people have been laid off
by major law firms alone (5872 lawyers/9563 staff ). Layoff Tracker, LAW
SHUCKS, http://lawshucks.com/layoff-tracker/ ( last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
331. See id.
332. See Matt Masich, Law School Career Offices Seek Fix for More Lawyers,
Fewer Jobs, L. WEEK COLO. (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.lawweekonline.com/
2009/10/career-offices-seek-fix-for-more-lawyers-fewer-jobs/ (on file with Minnesota Law Review) (discussing the impact of the recession on graduate recruitment at a top fifty law school); Debra Cassens Weiss, Downturn’s Losers:
BigLaw, ‘Entitled’ Associates, Top Schools, A.B.A. J. (May 7, 2009, 9:12 AM)
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/downturns_losers_biglaw_entitled_ass
ociates_top_schools (commenting on how the recession has affected the recruitment of graduates of elite law schools).
333. “Lockstep” firms are firms where partners are compensated based on
years in the partnership, rather than ability to bring in revenue. Although a
historically prominent means of compensating lawyers in firms, it is now unusual. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus
TRUST
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this context sense an opportunity to maintain or increase their
bottom line and regain control over the power dynamic between
335
associates and the firm. As firms take steps to save money,
the lawyer workforce may bear the burden. In particular, in
this economic environment, law firms can avoid filling vacant
positions and place heavier workloads on remaining associates,
using an underclass of “staff attorneys” to do particularly repetitive and rote tasks, while filling in epic peaks of work (e.g.,
discovery periods) with the most fungible and transient of
336
workforces—the contract attorney.
During the comfortable, pre-recession days, the forgiving
benevolence of plenty masked the inherent and complete lack of
power lawyers have in big law, because most lawyers had a
trump card up their sleeves—most attorneys, and certainly associates or partners, could leave and get a job elsewhere. With
this leverage gone, the true nature of the firm as an institution
is apparent; firms are on a mission to generate maximum work
output by all attorneys for the benefit of firm profit, without regard for attorney wellbeing or compatibility with ethical prac337
tice. Ultimately, only unionization can break this cycle. AssoTwo-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1706–09
(2005–2006) (documenting the growth of two-tier, non-lockstep, partnerships);
James D. Cotterman, Lockstep Compensation. Does it Still Merit Consideration? A.B.A. L. PRAC. TODAY (Aug. 2007), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/
articles/fin08071.shtml.
334. Amanda Ripley, Seniority Complex, AM. LAW., June 2000, at 84 (quoting Sidley Austin executive committee chair Thomas Cole’s statement that the
firm’s falling profits from the partnership ranks “could ultimately affect future
retention and recruiting and possibly even the way prospective clients would
assess the firm”).
335. Id.
336. Fenton, supra note 329, at 23.
337. A typical argument against unions is that they drive up costs and incentivize outsourcing. In this context, unionization may actually decrease
costs as it may increase efficiency and allow associates to negotiate for lower
pay in return for concessions regarding their hours. Furthermore, since attorney unionization and strikes are far more typical abroad than domestically,
outsourcing of legal work internationally would not allow firms to avoid dealing with collective action by lawyers. See, e.g., Algerian Lawyers Strike
Against ‘Repression,’ ASSOCIATED FREE PRESS (Oct. 25, 2011),
www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hHmws44xml7FaHEk6M9FX
5RJ307w (Algeria); John Nalianya, CJ Mutunga Blamed for Lawyers’ Strike,
NAIROBI STAR (January 11, 2012), http://allafrica.com/stories/201201120043
.html (Kenya); John Spano, I t a l i a n Lawyers Strike over New Mandatory Mediation, L. FORWARD (Mar. 14, 2011), http://lawforward.legalzoom.com/
competition/italian-lawyers-strike-over-new-mandatory-mediation-american
-legal-pundits-pile-on-consumerism-debated/ (Italy); Lawyers’ Strike Cripples
Delhi District Courts, TIMES OF INDIA (Jan. 12, 2012), http://timesofindia
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ciates need all firms to be bound to the same standards so that
partners feel free from fear of losing business to competitors.
Partners can use union requirements as a basis to go back to
clients and insist on more reasonable working conditions, such
as maximum hours in a given day or week. Contract and staff
attorneys are virtually powerless today, so a union that unites
all firm lawyers would beneficially serve their interest.
CONCLUSION
Law firms are keystone fixtures of the legal and business
communities. As such, they shape and drive the development of
civil law and practice, the structure of companies, and the enforcement of important state and federal regulations. Law
firms fund, staff, and support much of the profession’s charitable, pro bono, and non-profit work. They employ thousands of
lawyers throughout the world and have a strong voice in direct338
ing the legal profession. They aid in business development
and are instrumental to the economy. If law firms work poorly,
all of these areas are negatively affected. If law firms work
well, benefits flow far beyond their walls.
The application of new institutionalism to big law reveals
that the ethical tensions present in law firms are structural
and require structural solutions. How firms process work creates incentives and situations where ethical violations are more
likely to occur and go unnoticed. New institutionalism explains
that this is a structure that undermines an individual actor’s
ability to remedy professional misconduct. Essentially, firm attorneys have internalized institutional norms that hinder their
ability to change or counter the flaws of the system on their own.

.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Lawyers-strike-cripples-Delhi-district-courts/article
show/11459631.cms (India).
338. See Lawyer Demographics, A.B.A., http://new.abanet.org/market
research/PublicDocuments/Lawyer_Demographics.pdf ( last visited Apr. 16,
2012) (illustrating that in 2000, seventy-four percent of U.S. lawyers worked
in private practice and fourteen percent of those were employed by law firms
with more than 100 lawyers, accounting for more than ten percent of all U.S.
lawyers). The percentage rose between 2000 and 2007 as large law firms continued to grow and recruit a larger percentage of law graduates. The National
Association of Law Placement reports that between 2001 and 2006 law firms
recruited over fifty-five percent of all law graduates: large law firms with over
100 lawyers recruited approximately forty percent of those graduates, accounting for an astonishing twenty-two percent of all graduates nationwide. See
Trends in Graduate Employment—1985–2006, NAT’L ASS’N FOR L. PLACEMENT
(July 2007), http://www.nalp.org/2007julgraduateemployment/.
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This impotence extends throughout the chain-of-command, from
partners to associates and beyond.
Ultimately, the most effective solution to the ethical dilemmas this institutional culture raises is for private-sector attorneys to unionize, reform common labor practices in the sector, and restore a stronger sense of human dignity, pride, and
professionalism in a core part of the legal community. In the
current system, the private-sector attorney as an individual
has very little control or real leverage over his or her own work
product, working conditions and environment. Only a fundamental shift in the labor structure of the law firm and the
norms of private practice will allow the parties involved to reset
their corporate culture to one where every lawyer may fulfill
their ethical duties without impediment. Not only do firm attorneys have a right to unionize, they may have an ethical obligation to do so.

